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NOTES
CIVIL COMMITMENT AND THE "GREAT CONFINEMENT"
REVISITED: STRAIGHTJACKETING INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS,
STIFLING CULTURE*
[M]adness comes from God, whereas sober sense is merely
human.
-Socrates'
In 1860, Reverend Packard committed his wife, Elizabeth, to a
State public mental hospital where she remained for three
years.2 Reverend Packard was driven to this decision because
Mrs. Packard disagreed with his religious views.3 Although Mrs.
Packard may have suffered a period of mental illness at some
point in her life,4 her relative mental health or illness was unre-
lated to her forced hospitalization. Writing after her release, Mrs.
Packard compared her commitment to the mistreatment of witch-
es in an earlier era:
Had I lived in the sixteenth instead of the nineteenth century
* Dedicated to the special promise of Jordanna, born November 28, 1994.
1. PLATO, PHAEDRUS AND THE SEVENTH AND EIGHTH LETTERS 47 (Walter Hamil-
ton trans., 1973).
2. ALBERT DEUTSCH, THE MENTALLY ILL IN AMERICA 424 (2d ed. 1949); BARBARA
SAPINSLEY, THE PRIVATE WAR OF MRS. PACKARD 2 (1991).
3. THOMAS S. SZASZ, THE MANUFACTURE OF MADNESS: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF
THE INQUISITION AND THE MENTAL HEALTH MOVEMENT 130 (1970).
4. Some confusion exists on tis point Deutsch notes that, as a girl, Mrs.
Packard was hospitalized briefly in a psychuatric institution, and he also notes that it
appears "established" that she experienced delusions. DEUTSCH, supra note 2, at 424-
25. In particular, he refers to her reputed statement that she was the third person
in the Holy Trinity. Id. at 425. Contra SAPINSLEY, supra note 2, at 25 (suggesting
that Mrs. Packard's girlhood hospitalization was for delirium associated with unrecog-
nized meningitis or encephalitis); zd. at 15 (noting that her reference to herself as
part of the Holy Trinity was metaphorical and consistent with existing theological
doctrine).
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my husband would have used the laws of the day to punish
me as a heretic for this departure from the established
creed Much that is now called insanity will be looked
upon by future ages with a feeling similar to what we feel
toward those who suffered as witches in Salem, Massachu-
setts.5
Mrs. Packard's observations regarding the then-current stan-
dards of psychiatric diagnosis are chilling but accurate. Today, we
understand that nineteenth-century psychiatry was about social
control rather than medicine, and we reassure ourselves that
modern psychiatry is based firmly on science. We are convinced
that Mrs. Packard's commitment for, in effect, believing in the
wrong gods is a relic of a dark past, an experience no longer
possible given the modern scientific practice of psychiatry Is our
trust well placed?
In the early 1960s, a bright young man grew disillusioned with
the hedonistic culture of his time. Rejecting an era of rampant
drug use and wanton sexuality, Leonard Frank grew a beard,
immersed himself in the study of orthodox Judaism, and adopted
a vegetarian diet.' His complete departure from their own casual
Judaism and the developing mores of his generation alarmed his
parents.8 They involuntarily committed him for psychiatric treat-
5. SZASZ, supra note 3, at 130-31 (quoting 1 E.P W. PACKARD, MODERN PERSE-
CUTION: OR INSANE ASYLUMS UNVEILED 95 (1873)). After her release, Mrs. Packard
used her experiences to push for political reforms mn commitment laws and the care
of the institutionalized insane. SAPINSLEY, supra note 2, at 136-44, 180-81. But see
DEUTSCH, supra note 2, at 426-27 (suggesting that Mrs. Packard's reform efforts
were ultimately counterproductive for the rights of the mentally ill).
6. For representative critiques of nineteenth century psychiatry, see MICHEL
FOUCAULT, MADNESS AND CIVILIZATION: A HISTORY OF INSANITY IN THE AGE OF REA-
SON 241-78 (Richard Howard trans., 1988) (criticizing the putatively enlightened ap-
proaches of Turk and Pinel, fathers of nineteenth century psychiatry, as primarily a
form of moral coercion that continues to mfect modern psychiatry); JEFFREY M.
MASSON, A DARK SCIENCE: WOMEN, SEXUALITY, AND PSYCHIATRY IN THE NINETEENTH
CENTURY (1986) (criticizing nineteenth century psycuatry as misogynistic).
7. JUDI CHAMBERLIN, ON OUR OWN: PATIENT-CONTROLLED ALTERNATIVES TO THE
MENTAL HEALTH SYSTEM 4 (1978).
8. Id. Some critics charge that psychiatric diagnosis is little more than a pseudo-
medical validation of an essentially political decision made by the family or others.
James R. Greenley, Alternative Views of the Psychiatrtst's Role, zn LABELING MADNESS
34, 43-46 (Thomas J. Scheff ed., 1975). Under this view, Leonard Frank's parents,
having already concluded that he was "sick," consulted a psychiatrist, not for inde-
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ment 9 on the grounds that he was a danger to himself and oth-
ers.' Leonard Frank's psychiatrists felt that he required invol-
untary psychiatric commitment because of his "religiosity," his
"bizarre" dietary regimen, and his beard." These symptoms,
along with Frank's refusal to accept being characterized as in-
sane,12 justified a treatment regimen that ultimately included
fifty insulin coma-convulsive and thirty-five electroconvulsive
applications.'" After securing his release, 4 Frank wrote and
lectured about psychiatric abuses. 5
pendent investigation of the possibility that Frank was mentally ill, but rather for
confirmation of the familial-political decision they already had reached. It is revealing
that Frank, during an interview some years after his release, asserted that the doctor
was not his doctor but his parents' JOHN FRIEDBERG, M.D., SHOCK TREATMENT IS
NOT GOOD FOR YOUR BRAIN 61 (1976) (discussing interview with Leonard Roy
Frank). "He was not my doctor. He was the one who was hired to deal with me."
Id.
9. Frank remained hospitalized against Is will for eight months. FRIEDBERG,
supra note 8, at 58.
10. Frank was diagnosed as having a "Schizophrenic Reaction, Paranoid Type,
Chrome, Severe." The Frank Papers, reprinted in FRIEDBERG, supra note 8, at 72
(letter from treating psychiatrist to Leonard Frank's parents). The Frank Papers are
excerpts from Frank's actual hospital records while a patient.
Schizophrenia, Paranoid Type, is a particularly onerous diagnostic label. Paranoid
schizophrenia carries a public and professional aura of susceptibility to random and
wanton violence. For example, the AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, DIAGNOSTIC
AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS (4th ed. 1994) [hereinafter, DSM-
IV], while acknowledging that there is conflicting evidence regarding whether the
frequency of violent acts by schizophremcs is greater than in the general population,
warns of violence as a feature associated with only paranoid schizophrenia. Id. at
280, 287.
11. CHAMBERLIN, supra note 7, at 5.
12. Id.
13. The Frank Papers, supra note 10, at 79. Although a psychiatrist may consider
this "treatment," Leonard Frank, the recipient of these chemical and electric shock
treatments, reasonably views them as "torture." See Leonard Frank, An End to Si-
lence, in THE HISTORY OF SHOCK TREATMENT 104 (Leonard R& Frank ed., 1978). In a
poem, Frank insists that:
we will call things
by their real names
its not shock treatment
its shock torture.
Id.
14. Frank never accepted the diagnosis that he was insane. Instead, he consciously
and wilfully lied to ns therapists by adopting their perspective just long enough to
secure his release. CHAMBERLIN, supra note 7, at 74 (citing personal interview with
Leonard R. Frank, Dec. 7, 1976).
15. See generally THE HISTORY OF SHOCK TREATMENT, supra note 13 (a collection
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These stories, although anecdotal and taken from history, raise
a number of important questions regarding present-day commit-
ment procedures. Upon what grounds will society sanction invol-
untary psychiatric commitment? What protection do citizens have
from wrongful deprivation of their liberty pursuant to a finding
of committable mental illness? Are these protections properly
matched to the state of modern psychiatry9 How is the balance
between individual liberty and social welfare realized? Does this
balance accurately reflect our constitutional principles? In short,
how safe can we feel?
This Note will focus on the justifications for involuntary psy-
chiatric commitment and the procedure by which such commit-
ment is accomplished. This Note first will examine the constitu-
tional standards that justify civil commitment and will consider
contemporary critiques of these guidelines from two perspectives:
the concerns of Pro-Treatment critics who believe that overem-
phasis on individual rights blocks access to treatment for people
desperately in need, and the criticisms of Pro-Rights critics who
assert that the constitutional safeguards Are already too lax. This
discussion will conclude with a hypothetical case for the reader to
consider based on the preceding analysis.
This Note then will examine the evidentiary requirements for
civil commitment and will mirror the previous discussion in
structure. First, the evidentiary rules that guide the adjudicative
process in involuntary commitment hearings will be explained in
detail. Next, criticisms of these requirements from both the Pro-
Treatment and Pro-Rights perspectives will be considered. This
discussion concludes by expanding upon the hypothetical raised
earlier, allowing the reader to consider the evidentiary
requirements' impact on tle hypothetical.
Next, this Note will present a limited case study of commit-
ment hearings in a public mental hospital in Virginia. This dis-
cussion will begin by comparing Virginia's statutory guidelines
for commitment and its evidentiary rules with those of other
states in order to establish the relevance of a study based solely
in Virginia for a national consideration of civil commitment. The
of writings by Frank and others on the abuses of psychiatric treatment); The Frank
Papers, supra note 10.
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purpose of this case study is to examine how well the theoretical
protection for those subjected to civil commitment hearings plays
out in actual practice. The Virginia case study will provide in-
sight into the relative strengths and weaknesses of the Pro-Treat-
ment and Pro-Rights critiques presented earlier. Again, this dis-
cussion will close with a return to the hypothetical case to con-
sider, in light of the findings of the case study, how modern
courts might dispose of the issues raised in the hypothetical.
This Note concludes that an improper balance has been struck
between the competing concerns at issue in the civil commitment
context and will revisit the hypothetical in light of the hidden
social cost of this improper balance.
THE CONSTITUTIONAL STANDARDS: GUIDELINES FOR
INVOLUNTARY COMMITMENT
The Policy Rationales
Two compelling State interests justify involuntary psychiatric
commitment: the police power to protect the general welfare and
the parens patrzae power to protect an individual who cannot
protect himself.'6 The Supreme Court attempted to define the
extent and limit of these dual justifications for involuntary civil
commitment in O'Connor v. Donaldson.7
Kenneth Donaldson was confined in a Florida state mental
hospital against his will for nearly fifteen years.'8 The hospital's
superintendent, Dr. J.B. O'Connor denied his repeated requests
for release. 9 Donaldson eventually sued for deprivation of his
16. Mark S. Kaufman, "Crazy" Until Proven Innocent? Civil Commitment of the
Mentally Ill Homeless, 19 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 333, 336 (1988).
17. 422 U.S. 563 (1975).
There can be little doubt that in the exercise of its police power a State
may confine individuals solely to protect society from the dangers of sig-
nificant antisocial acts Additionally, the States are vested with the
historic parens patriae power, including the duty to protect "persons un-
der legal disabilities to act for themselves."
Id. at 582-83 (Burger, C.J., concurring) (quoting Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S.
251, 257 (1972)).
18. Id. at 564.
19. Id. at 565. The record suggests that Dr. O'Connor was not a neutral arbiter of
the merit of Donaldson's pleas for release. When an advocacy orgaization, Helping
Hands, wrote asking that Donaldson be released to their care, Dr. O'Connor respond-
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constitutional right to liberty 20 He claimed throughout his con-
finement that he was neither dangerous nor mentally ill, and
that the hospital was not providing him with treatment.2' He
was successful at trial and on appeal,22 and the Supreme Court
accepted the jury's finding that Donaldson was not dangerous
and, if mentally ill, had not received treatment during his hospi-
talization." The crucial question before the Court was whether
a finding of mental illness alone could justify continued confine-
ment.24 In deciding this question, the Court established the con-
stitutional boundaries for civil commitment. -5
The Court held that an individual cannot be committed on the
mere finding that he is mentally ill without proof of a further
compelling need for confinement. In addition, the State may
not commit a mentally ill person in order to raise his standard of
living.2 The mere fact that a person can live more comfortably
ed that the hospital would release Donaldson only to his parents. Id. at 568. Not
only was this an arbitrary rule of O'Connor's own creation, but O'Connor knew that
Donaldson's parents were too old and infirm to care for him. Id. at 568-69. Shortly
after O'Connor retired, the hospital staff supported Donaldson in attaining not only
his release but a judicial restoration of his competency as well. Id. at 568. A few
months after discharge, Donaldson secured "responsible" employment as a hotel ad-
ministrator. Id.
20. Id. at 565.
21. Id. At trial, Donaldson "demonstrated, without contradiction, that [he] had
posed no danger at any point in his life." Id. at 568. Donaldson also established
that, throughout his hospitalization, he had not received treatment but merely "en-
forced custodial care." Id. at 569. When O'Connor claimed at trial that the patient's
treatment consisted of "'milieu therapy,"' his own hospital staff countertestified that,
in Donaldson's case, "'milieu therapy' was a euphemism for confinement in the
'milieu' of a mental hospital." Id. at 569.
22. Donaldson v. O'Connor, 493 F.2d 507 (5th Cir. 1974) (affirrnmg a jury verdict
for Donaldson), vacated, 422 U.S. 563 (1975).
23. O'Connor, 422 U.S. at 573.
24. Id. at 574.
25. Joseph T. Carney, Note, America's Mentally Ill: Tormented Without Treatment 3
GEO. MASON U. Civ. RTs. L.J. 181, 190 (1992) (describing O'Connor as the "leading
case" for setting the parameters for involuntary civil commitment). Pro-Treatment
proponents despair the holding in O'Connor and ruefully credit it with having umn-
tentionally jump-started deinstitutionalization. RAEL J. ISSAC & VIRGINIA C. ARMAT,
MADNESS IN THE STREETS: HOW PSYCHIATRY AND THE LAW ABANDONED THE MENTAL-
LY ILL 135-37 (1990) ("The clhef impact of the Donaldson case was not in ensuiing a
right to treatment, but in spurring deinstitutionalization.").
26. O'Connor, 422 U.S. at 574-75.
27. Id. at 575. The Supreme Court correctly noted that even a mentally ill person
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in an institution than elsewhere is not sufficient justification for
civil commitment." Finally, the State cannot commit an other-
wise harmless, mentally ill person in order to protect its citizenry
from his eccentricity 29 In summary, "there is still no constitu-
tional basis for confining such [mentally ill] persons involuntarily
if they are dangerous to no one and can live safely in free-
dom."3 These holdings, establishing the permissible boundaries
for civil commitment, have been challenged for relying upon
untenable justifications for involuntary psychiatric commitment.
Cntzczsms
The Supreme Court's permissible justifications for involuntary
psychiatric commitment are criticized from two perspectives,
which this Note shall refer to as the Pro-Treatment and Pro-
Rights positions. The Pro-Treatment critique argues that the
standards for involuntary psychiatric commitment give too much
protection to individual rights at the expense of providing neces-
sary treatment and care to those suffering from mental illness.
The Pro-Rights critique argues that the standards provide too
little protection to individuals who find themselves at the mercy
may prefer living in his own home over living in the supposititious "comforts" of a
mental hospital. Id. Of course, the question confronting many mentally ill today is
whether the courts will permit them to prefer life on the streets to life in an insti-
tution. So far, the answer appears to be no. See, e.g., Boggs v. New York City
Health & Hosp. Corp., 523 N.Y.S.2d 71 (N.Y. App. Div. 1987) (involuntarily commit-
thig a homeless schizophreic woman who the court said was not dangerous).
Some communities have tried to resolve the plight of the homeless by building
shelters and then threatenmng the homeless with arrest if they refuse to accept the
city-supplied accommodations. See, e.g., Laura Irwin, Next Question: What If the
Homeless Don't Want Shelter?, MIAMI TODAY, July 14, 1994, at 3. This issue raises
the question whether a person has the right to refuse shelter, independent of relative
mental health. Put another way, could Thoreau have been subject to arrest? Justice
Stewart, writing for the majority in O'Connor, invited courts to deprive individuals of
their liberty when he wrote that a person may be considered dangerous to himself if,
for any reason, "he is helpless to avoid the hazards of freedom." O'Connor, 422 U.S.
at 574 n.9. Those who would like to expand the permissible boundaries of involun-
tary commitment emphasize tis language. See, e.g., Carney, supra note 25, at 190
(describing Stewart's phrase as loosening the "dangerousness" standard).
28. O'Connor, 422 U.S. at 575.
29. Id.
30. Id
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of the civil commitment process. 1 A brief examination of each
critique follows.
The Pro-Treatment Crztzque
Proponents of less stringent commitment procedures view the
submission toward individual rights as standing needlessly in the
way of access to treatment for those desperately in need of treat-
ment.32 According to Pro-Treatment advocates, in mental illness
the "diseased organ is the brain,"33 and the mentally ill there-
fore are unable to make rational choices required to exercise
effectively the freedom that the law permits.3"
From this perspective, any commitment standard that requires
a prediction of dangerousness is unduly restrictive, in part be-
cause "dangerousness is the one characteristic of mental illness
that doctors are unable to predict with reasonable scientific
certainty,"35 and in part because the official policy of the Ameri-
can Psychiatric Association is that considerations involved in
characterizing mental disorders are not necessarily an appropri-
ate basis for legal conclusions. 8 Owing to the difficulties in pre-
dicting future behavior of any kind, the State often cannot meet
this exacting standard. As a result, the mentally ill are "free"
until they break-the law, and the jails then become substitute in-
sane asylums.3 7
31. See infra notes 57-59 and accompanying text
32. ISAAC & ARMAT, supra note 25; Paul S. Appelbaum & Thomas G. Gutheil,
"Rotting with Their Rights On" Constitutional Theory and Clinical Reality in Drug
Refusal by Psychiatric Patients, 7 BULL AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 306, 314-15
(1979); Carney, supra note 25.
33. ISSAC & ARMAT, supra note 25, at 111.
34. Id., see also Carney, supra note 25, at 182 ("But what liberties are being pro-
tected [by strict commitment guidelines]? The freedom to be ill and have irrational
thoughts?").
35. Carney, supra note 25, at 198; see also Edmund V Ludwig, The Mentally Ill
Homeless: Evolving Involuntary Commitment Issues, 36 VILL. L. REV. 1085, 1099-1100
(1991) (stating that mental health expert testimony should be more limited because
many times it exceeds the mental professional's sphere of expertise).
36. DSM-IV, supra note 10, at xxvii (cautionary statement).
37. Ludwig, supra note 35, at 1094. Ludwig notes that the reverse is also true.
Mental hospital populations have grown increasingly dangerous, interfering with the
functionmg of the hospital. Id. at 1094-95; see also ALAN A. STONE, LAW, PSYCHIA-
TRY, AND MORALITY 51 (1984) (noting that the "dangerousness" standard has bred a
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Pro-Treatment proponents also criticize the dangerousness
standard for failing to protect other interests. Ironically, the
chronic but non-dangerous mentally ill may desire treatment yet
be turned away because their pathologies do not rise to the level
of the dangerousness threshold. 8 Rejecting the non-dangerous
mentally ill burdens the families of the mentally ill who are
"forced to care for those they cannot treat." 9 Finally, the rights
of the larger society who desire minimal standards of behavior in
public places are ignored in favor of the mentally ill individual's
"right to be crazy ""
Rather than a dangerousness standard, Pro-Treatment advo-
cates insist that severity of illness should be the legal standard
for civil commitment,4" whereby courts evaluate the competency
of the mentally ill person to make rational choices regarding
treatment.42 Such an evaluation would measure three charac-
teristics of the individual under consideration: the individual's
new class of mental patients, "males between age 20 and 40 who are more vio-
lent, and who are resistant to treatment."). A one thousand-bed public mental
hospital experienced 297 staff-observed, and 397 reported but unobserved, incidences
of patient-initiated assaults m a six-month period. Michael S. Ito, Breaking the Law
m a Psyclnatric Hospital: Is It Therapeutic To Press Charges?, Paper Presented at
the American Psychological Association Annual Convention, tbl 1 (Aug., 1986) (on file
with author).
This change m the character of the traditional mental patient also has affected
the relationship between the mental health care provider and the mental patient. See,
e.g., Tamara Jones, Disturbed, Homeless on the Edge, WASH. POST, Jan. 4, 1994, at
D1, D6 (reporting a mental health facility had a patient arrested for assaulting a
nurse). The dangerousness standard forced psychologists to think through the circum-
stances, clinical and legal, under which mental health care providers might appropr-
ately sue their patients. Ito, supra, at case example 1. Without disputing the very
real changes that a "commitment pursuant to a finding of dangerousness" standard
has wrought, these changes are chiefly of concern to the hospital staff and prison
guards. For the individual deprived of liberty, the difference between jail and a men-
tal hospital is no more than a secondary concern.
38. ISAAC & ARMAT, supra note 25, at 346. But see ARLENE S. KANTER, CURRENT
ISSUES IN MENTAL HEALTH LAW 11 (1989) (arguing that failure to treat is largely a
result of a bed shortage and other factors rather than the civil commitment stan-
dard).
39. ISAAC & ARMAT, supra note 25, at 339-40 (noting that some families have been
driven to fabricate violent events m a desperate attempt to get help for their chil-
dren).
40. Id. at 340.
41. See zd. at 106; Carney, supra note 25, at 198-99.
42. Carney, supra note 25, at 199.
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awareness, the voluntariness of the individual's behavior and
choices, and the individual's overall competency "3 Proponents
argue that these criteria, unlike a dangerousness standard, would
allow mental health professionals to do what they do
best-diagnose mental illness rather than predict future danger-
ousness.
44
The Pro-Treatment position is mistaken in its philosophical
anthropology; its supporters err in their fundamental under-
standing of the nature and essence of man. Emphasis on the
brain as the seat of mind is a remnant of now-discredited Car-
tesian Dualism.4 5  Pro-Treatment advocates ignore current
43. Id.
44. Id. at 200.
45. Cartesian Dualism holds that "mmd" is separate from all corporeal matter. The
gulf between "mmd" and "body," or "mind" and "world" is unbridgeable. Erwin W.
Straus, Anesthesiology and Hallucinations, in EXISTENCE: A NEW DIMENSION IN PSY-
CHIATRY AND PSYCHOLOGY 139, 141-42 (Rollo May et al. eds., 1958) [collection as
whole hereinafter EXISTENCE]. At its most fundamental level, this chasm divides sub-
ject and object. Rollo May, Contributions of Existential Psychotherapy, in EXISTENCE,
supra, at 58.
Cartesian Dualism is named for, and arises out of, the philosophy of Rene Des-
cartes. RENE DESCARTES, DISCOURSE ON METHOD AND MEDITATIONS, at x (Laurence J.
Lafleur trans., 1960). Descartes set out to discover apodictic truth-absolute certamty.
Id. His "first rule was never to accept anything as true unless certainly and
evidently such." Id. at 15. He sought this indisputable truth in human experience
rather than in the external world. Descartes proceeded from the proposition that
"there is nothing certain in this world," id. at 81, and rejected even mathematical
proofs, id. at 77-79.
Descartes found apodictic truth in his experience of hinself as a thmking being.
"I must finally conclude and maintain that this proposition: I am, I exist, is neces-
sarily true every time that I pronounce it or conceive it in my mind." Id. at 82. This
proof is known as the Cogito sum: I think, therefore I am. In defining truth as sole-
ly dependant upon subjective experience, Descartes makes problematic the connection
of the thinker to the external world or even his own body. May, supra, at 61 ("Since
Descartes the soul and nature have had nothing to do with each other.").
Cartesian Dualism is under attack in the twentieth century. See, e.g., MARTIN
HEIDEGGER, BEING AND TIME 122-34 (John Macquarrie & Edward Robinson trans.,
1962). In capsule form, Heidegger's critique of Cartesian Dualism may be summarized
as follows: Cognition and perception originate as an experience of a human subject.
Thought and sensation, therefore, are necessarily subjective in that they have no
existence apart from the subject who thinks and perceives. The perception that a
"thing" (for example, the chair in which you are sitting) is an "objective" entity
separate from the perceiver (the reader who sees and feels the chair), is merely a
subjective experience of the thing as being independent of the perceiver. "Objective"
truth consists of widely held intersubjective experiences-virtually every subject would
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trends in philosophy and science that understand the mind as en-
thused throughout and coterminous with corporeal matter."
According to Dr. Richard Bergland, a highly respected neurosur-
geon and scientist, modern neurology has discarded the old no-
tion that the brain is distinct from the body because the former
was driven by electricity and the latter by molecules." Modern
science now understands that the brain, like other organs, is a
gland-'he brain is one with the body "" An interplay of hor-
mones between the brain and other organs drives human
thought. As Dr. Bergland observes, "the brain does not sing
'solos' to the body, but 'harmonies."'49 Thinking occurs outside,
as well as inside, the brain.0
experience the chair as existing independently of one's experience of it. No "objec-
tive" proof of that belief is possible, however, because human subjects are incapable
of adopting an objective perspective. Id.
The same analysis holds for the experience of a "split" between mind and body.
The body qua object may be experienced as distinct from one's mind, but that expe-
rience is itself subjective because it is not susceptible of "objective" proof. Referring
to the impossibility of proving a connection between Subject and Object (e.g., mind
and body or human consciousness and world), a proof made necessary by Cartesian
Dualism, Heidegger states that "[t]he 'scandal of philosophy' is not that tis proof
has yet to be given, but that such proofs are expected and attempted again and
again." Id. at 249. Heidegger reverses Descartes' cogito sum by recognzing that hu-
man beings already are caught up in the world. Id. at 254. Heidegger, then, replaces
the cogito sum with lns concept of "Bemg-in-the-world"-the idea that the Sub-
jectlObject duality is an illusion. Id. Mind and body, human consciousness and world,
are unities. Id. at 78-86, 138-44.
In assessing the relative merits of Heidegger's and Descartes' philosophies, one
must bear in mind that both were searching for apodictic truth and that both sought
it m human experience rather than in the external world. MARTIN HEIDEGGER, Mod-
ern Science, Metaphysics, and Mathematics, in BASIC WRITINGS 247, 278-82 (David F.
Krell ed., 1977). Both understood that one can never be "wrong" about one's own
experience even if one's experience of the world is mistaken. That is, one may mis-
takenly believe (from the standpoint of intersubjective validity) that the world is flat,
but the fact that one so believes is absolutely true. Because Heidegger and Descartes
both sought apodictic truth mi experience, one can fairly conclude that Descartes,
were he alive today, would concede to the truth of Heidegger's greater insight.
"[logito--sum is the fundamental axiom of all knowledge; but it is not the only
fundamental axiom " Id. at 281.
46. See generally RICHARD BERGLAND, THE FABRIC OF MIND (1986). Iromcally, tbis
movement is itself a return, mi part, to Spmozaistic principles of matter and spirit.
See, e.g., BENEDICT E. SPINOZA, ETHICS (R.H.M. Elwes trans., 1974).
47. BERGLAND, supra note 46, at 80.
48. Id. at 162.
49. Id. at 104.
50. Id. at 109 ("The mechanisms that drive thought are found all over the
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From a more practical standpoint, the Pro-Treatment position
severely undervalues individual rights and overvalues the cura-
tive powers of psychiatry The Pro-Treatment camp acknowledges
that mental illness-particularly those manifestations of psycho-
pathology that are most likely to excite the state to seek commit-
ment-probably is not curable given the current state of psychi-
atric medicine. Nonetheless, proponents argue that treatment can
help the mentally ill "lead a comparatively normal life."'" At
best, this assertion is highly debatable. If Pro-Treatment propo-
nents believe life in a mental hospital is "comparatively normal,"
then they probably have not spent much time in a mental hospi-
tal setting. Those who have, either as patients,52 pseudo pa-
tients," or hospital observers,54 report a different picture of
body "); cf id. at 105-07 (discussing how the ovaries "think"). Dr. Bergland
explicitly recognizes that this new paradigm for understanding the brain and the
nature of thought constitutes a rejection of Cartesian Dualism. Id. at 107-09.
51. Carney, supra note 25, at 183.
52. See, e.g., CHAMBERLAIN, supra note 7; VOICES FROM THE ASYLUM (M. Glenn ed.,
1974); The Frank Papers, supra note 10, at 62. All three works are collections of
writings from involuntary mental patients describing their experiences.
53. Pseudo patients are individuals who have faked their way into mental hospitals
for the purpose of studying hospital life. See ANTHONY BRANDT, REALITY POLICE: THE
EXPERIENCE OF INSANITY IN AMERICA 190 (1975) ("[S]omethmg happened to me at
[the mental hospital], something nearly drove me crazy. IT]hough I was not a
'real' mental patient I was under the control of the staff, I was living like a pa-
tient My situation began to feel ambiguous. And I began to pamc."); D.L.
Rosenhan, On Being Sane zn Insane Places, 179 SCI. 250, 256 (1973) Rosenhan found
the staff ignored patients to the point where the patients felt "invisible." In one
instance, a nurse unbuttoned her blouse to re-adjust her bra in full view of several
male patients. In doing so, she acted in disregard of the patients rather than seduc-
tively. Id.
In both of these instances, researchers faked their way into the hospital by re-
porting a single instance of auditory hallucination. BRANDT, supra, at 162; Rosenhan,
supra, at 251. It is not surprising that one can lie about one's mental experience and
be admitted- to a hospital. Once in, however, the researchers behaved normally yet
were never identified as sane. Rosenhan, supra, at 251. In Rosenhan's words, "[t)he
[niormal [a]re [niot [detectably [slane." Id. at 252.
54. See ERVING GOFFMAN, ASYLUMS: ESSAYS ON THE SOCIAL SITUATION OF MENTAL
PATIENTS AND OTHER INMATES (1962). Goffman was not only an observer, but an
actual hospital employee. He spent a year as a recreation counsellor at St. Elizabeth's
Hospital in Washington, D.C., to observe the social situation of mental patients. The
hospital administration granted Goffman permission to work and observe for the pur-
poses of his study. ROBERT PERRUCCI, CIRCLE OF MADNESS: ON BEING INSANE AND
INSTITUTIONALIZED IN AMERICA (1974) (reporting results of a year-long field study at
a mental hospital in the midwest).
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hospital life. Further, the Supreme Court has expressly rejected
the idea that the parens patrzae power of the State authorizes
forcible confinement of the mentally ill merely to improve their
living conditions.55 Justifying the deprivation of liberty imposed
by civil commitment requires something more than a desire to
help those diagnosed as mentally ill.56
The Pro-Rights Critique
On the opposite end of the spectrum, Pro-Rights proponents
argue that statutes allowing confinement on the basis of a fore-
seeable likelihood that the accused5 will be dangerous are un-
constitutional and place excessive reliance on the power of psy-
chiatrists to predict future dangerousness." This standard for
confinement permits discrimination against the homeless, among
others.59
According to Pro-Rights critics, statutes that allow the forced
confinement of individuals who have not actually committed any
violent acts but whose behavior is seen as "dangerous in the
reasonably foreseeable future" are unconstitutionally vague and
overbroad.' These statutes necessarily fail to forewarn citizens
of the conduct that would justify their confinement. By permit-
ting a complete curtailment of liberty when less restrictive means
are available,6 the state readily can use such statutes to discrimi-
55. O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 575 (1975).
56. Id-
57. Admittedly, a psychiatric commitment hearing is not a criminal trial. See
Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 423-24 (1979). However, the person whose sanity
is tested by such a hearing risks loss of liberty. The term "accused," therefore, is an
apt description of the defendant in such a hearing.
58. See Kaufman, supra note 16.
59. Id,
60. Id. at 344-45. In the 1980s, New York considered language permitting commit-
ment based on a standard of "dangerous in the reasonably foreseeable future," but
the legislature repeatedly rejected tbis standard precisely because it is vague and
overbroad. Ludwig, supra note 35, at 1107.
61. One less restrictive option is commitment to outpatient treatment, Virgina
allows outpatient commitment as a less restrictive alternative to institutional confine-
ment even after a finding of dangerousness if "deemed suitable" by the judge. VA.
CODE ANN. § 37.1-67.3 (Miclne Supp. 1994). As a practical matter, it is lnghly unlike-
ly that a judge, after finding a person to be an immnent danger to himself or oth-
ers, will then release that person back into the community.
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nate against the homeless mentally ill or the homeless in gen-
eral.62
Pro-Rightists also fear that the lack of clearly defined standards
in civil commitment statutes leads judges to apply an excessively
loose construction to these statutes. " Judges may avoid strict
construction of civil commitment statutes because of either their
fears for the untreated mentally ill 4 or their fears of the untreat-
ed mentally ill.65 The problem of loose statutory construction is
particularly acute because judges are already unduly dependant
upon the opinions of expert witnesses66 who tend to overpredict
dangerousness and the severity of mental illness." The relaxed
standard of appellate review further exacerbates this problem.
Courts rarely overturn commitment decisions because they need
only be based on "substantial professional judgement."'
Statutes authorizing the involuntary commitment of persons
whose dangerous behavior is a future assumption rather than a
North Carolina was the first State to allow outpatient commitment upon a lower
standard than dangerousness, ISSAC & ARMAT, supra note 25, at 314, thus solving the
practical inconsistency of finding a person dangerous yet releasing that person back
into the community, but raising the issue of the State's right to commit. Although
outpatient commitment is less onerous than institutional confinement, it remains an
interference with individual liberty. See Susan Stefan, Preventive Commitment: The
Concept and Its Pitfalls, 11 MENTAL & PHYSICAL DISABILITY L. REP 288, 292 (1987)
(stating that "the scheme creates extended deprivations of liberty with little or no fi-
nancial savings for the State"); see also KANTER, supra note 38, at 12-13.
62. Kaufman, supra note 16, at 344-46.
63. See Michael L. Perlin, On "Sansm," 46 SMU L. REV. 373, 402-03 (1992) (ar-
guing that only the most arbitrary and baseless decisions can be challenged).
64. Id. at 401-02 (stating that release might lead to homelessness).
65. Id. at 402 (arguing that judges are susceptible to "samst" myths of the men-
tally ill, including the myth that the mentally ill are almost always prone to vio-
lence).
66. See Donald N. Bersoff, Judicial Deference to Nonlegal Deczszonmakers: Imposing
Simplistic Solutions on Problems of Cognitive Complexity in Mental Disability Law, 46
SMU L. REV. 329, 331-35 (1992) (noting the heavy reliance of the courts on mental
health professionals); Susan Stefan, Leaving Civil Rights to the "Experts"- From Def-
erence to Abdication Under the Professional Judgement Standard, 102 YALE L.J. 639,
644 (1992) (arguing judges rely too heavily upon professional opinions).
67. Expert predictions of future dangerousness are so maccurate that one commen-
tator concludes that "professional judgment is simply judgment made by a profession-
al, not a judgment that has any special validity and is often no better than lay
judgment." Bersoff, supra note 66, at 362. For a discussion of research regarding
limitations on the powers of psychiatrists to predict dangerousness, see infra, note 70.
68. Perlin, supra note 63, at 402.
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present fact also bypass the Supreme Court's restrictions on con-
finement. The Supreme Court has rejected confinement based
solely on a finding of mental illness, imposed solely to improve
living conditions of the mentally ill, or imposed solely to protect the
citizenry from idiosyncratic behavior.69 Nonetheless, a person who
has done no harm to himself or others, but who lives in squalor and
whose beliefs and behavior violate the broad band of socially-ac-
cepted reality and mores, can suffer confinement based upon a
highly unreliable prediction'0 that the person will be dangerous
in the future. Such a person is not confined by society because
of dangerousness but because of a mixture of paternalism 1 and
repulsion. 2
69. O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 575-76 (1975).
70. For a critique of the accuracy of psychiatric predictions of future dangerous-
ness, see Bersoff, supra note 66, at 355-57 (discussing studies that demonstrate be-
tween a 65% to 86% false positive rate for psychiatric predictions of violence); Bruce
J. Enis & Thomas R. Litwack, Psychiatry and the Presumption of Expertise: Flipping
Coins in the Courtroom, 62 CAL. L. REV. 693, 711-16 (1974) (arguing that psychiatric
predictions of violence are no more accurate than a corn flip); David Faust & Jay
Ziskin, The Expert Witness in Psychology and Psychiatry, 241 SC. 31, 32 (1988) (cit-
mg studies which indicate that psychiatrists may be wrong in over two of every three
cases); Alan M. Dershowitz, The Psychiatrist's Power in Civil Commitment: A Knife
That Cuts Both Ways, PSYCHOL. TODAY, Feb., 1969, at 43, 47 (noting that of those
"confined on the basis of psychiatric predictions of violence there are only a few who
would, and many more who would not, actually engage in such conduct if released").
But see Joseph E. Jacoby, Dangerousness of the Mentally Ill-A Methodological Re-
consideration, in DANGEROUS BEHAVIOR: A PROBLEM IN LAW & MENTAL HEALTH 20,
31-32 (Calvin J. Frederick ed., 1978) (stating that better methods of data collection
may reveal that psychiatric predictions of dangerousness may be substantially more
accurate than believed); Joseph M. Livermore et al., On the Justifications for Civil
Commitment, 117 U. PA. L. REV. 75, 84 (1968) (arguing that low frequency events
are inevitably overpredicted).
71. See Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 426 (1979) (noting that a "State has a
legitimate interest under its parens patriae powers"). At least one commentator ap-
pears to advocate a paternalistic role for lawyers. See David B. Wexler, Therapeutic
Jurisprudence and the Criminal Courts, 35 WM. & MARY L. REV. 279, 284-86 (1993)
("[Diefense lawyers would need to coax more actively those clients who lack plausible
defenses to admit guilt and accept the bargain."). For a detailed review and critique
of Wexler's "therapeutic jurisprudence" proposal, see infra notes 95-120 and accompa-
nymg text Most of the lawyers representing civil commitment defendants m the case
study presented in this Note, see znfra notes 181-215 and accompanying text, do not
mount vigorous defenses because of a paternalistic belief that the defendant needs
psychiatric treatment.
72. See Ludwig, supra note 35, at 1096 (describing the "counterdemstitutionalizing
effect" of the mentally ill homeless whose mere presence mcited "complaints stirred
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Hypothetical
Having discussed the policy considerations implicated in the
involuntary commitment debate, 3 this Note will describe a hy-
pothetical situation in which the protagonist's arguably unusual
behavior encourages his family to seek involuntary commitment.
This hypothetical provides a context through which the discus-
sion can weigh the merits of the State's interests in confining its
citizens.
Paul is a successful stockbroker, married with three children,
who takes up song-writing in his late twenties as a hobby Pos-
sessing scant musical experience, Paul soon begins to view him-
self as a musical genius. He believes that the wider society does
not properly appreciate his talents, although limited segments of
the music-loving population find Paul to be a competent
songsmith. Convinced of his own genius and before making any
profit from his music, Paul quits his job to devote himself full
time to his songwriting. He informs his wife of his decision to
quit work only after it is a fat accompli. Paul's wife understand-
ably is upset, not the least because he was the family's sole
means of support. She petitions to have him' committed to invol-
untary psychiatric treatment.
Is Paul mentally ill? If so, should he be committed? Pro-
Treatment advocates might argue that this case illustrates the
need for a legal standard for civil commitment that focuses on
illness rather than dangerousness.' Paul poses no immediate
danger to himself or his family, but his actions appear so mani-
festly irrational as to suggest a compelling need for treatment. A
social policy that interferes with treatment, by barring commit-
ment without a showing of dangerousness or grave inability to
care for self, serves neither Paul nor his family
Conversely, Pro-Rights enthusiasts might argue that this case
demonstrates the importance of establishing high standards for
civil commitment.75 Although Paul's decisions are unusual, they
by feelings of fear, anger, resentment and guilt"); see also Perlin, supra note 63,
at 388-98 (describing "samst" biases and myths).
73. See supra notes 16-30 and accompanying text.
74. See supra notes 32-56 and accompanying text.
75. See supra notes 57-72 and accompanying text.
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are not criminal, and no reason exists to fear that he is about to
harm anyone. Instead, he has exercised his right to self-determi-
nation, even if his choice is misguided. If his wife is sufficiently
upset, she has the right to leave him. However, society ought not
to confine hzm because she is disturbed.
THE CONSTITUTIONAL STANDARDS: THE EVIDENTIARY
GUIDELINES
Standard of Proof and Evidentiary Requzrements
The Standard of Proof
Inasmuch as an individual's liberty is at stake in a commit-
ment hearing, one would expect, incorrectly, that the necessary
standard of proof of dangerousness or of an inability to care for
oneself would be the same as in a criminal trial7 -"beyond a
reasonable doubt." In Addington v. Texas," the Supreme Court
distinguished the psychiatric commitment hearing from a crimi-
nal trial and held that the former requires only a standard of
proof greater than the mere "preponderance of the evidence"
standard used in ordinary civil proceedings."
The Supreme Court distinguishes between civil commitment
hearings and criminal trials-permitting a lower standard of
proof in the former-based upon the State's motive for initiating
each proceeding and the relative costs of error in each setting.7 9
In Addington, the Court found it noteworthy that the State, in
seeking psychiatric commitment, does not exercise its power "in a
punitive-fashion."" ° In other words, the benevolent motive of the
actor who deprives one of liberty makes that deprivation less
76. Marcy H. Speiser, Indigents and the Dental of Due Process at Involuntary
Treatment Hearings: The Need for Independent Psychiatric Assistance, 8 TOURO L.
REV. 141, 143 n.14 (1991) (arguing that "the due process concerns in both the crimi-
nal judicial proceeding and the civil involuntary treatment hearing are similar in na-
ture").
77. 441 U.S. 418 (1979).
78. Id. at 432-33. ("To meet due process demands, the standard [of proof] has to
inform the fact finder that the proof must be greater than the preponderance-of-the-
evidence standard applicable to other categories of civil cases.").
79. Id. at 428-29.
80. Id. at 428.
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onerous.
Also central to the Court's distinction between civil commit-
ment and criminal trials were the consequences of error in each
setting.81 In the context of a criminal trial, an erroneous finding
of innocence has no negative consequences for the individual
whereas, in the Court's words:
[I]t is not true that the release of a genuinely mentally ill
person is no worse for the individual than the failure to con-
vict the guilty One who is suffering from a debilitating mental
illness and in need of treatment is neither wholly at liberty
nor free of stigma. It cannot be said, therefore, that it is much
better for a mentally ill person to "go free" than for a men-
tally normal person to be committed. 2
The Court has reduced drastically the liberty interests of all
citizens by implying that the opportunity to receive psychiatric
treatment is of a higher value than liberty83 because the Justices
seem to be willing to allow the mentally normal to be wrongly
committed rather than allow the mentally ill to be wrongly re-
leased. Moreover, the Court underestimates the supreme value
individuals and cultures place on liberty 4 The proposition that
the mentally ill person would prefer treatment consequent to
involuntary commitment over no commitment and no treatment
is not axiomatc 85 given the high esteem in which liberty has
81. Id. at 428-29.
82. Id. at 429 (citations omitted). With this holding, the Court turns a fundamen-
tal principle of the common law on its head. The burden of proof serves to protect
the wrongly accused, not to ensure appropriate handling of an accurately charged
defendant. Coffin v. United States, 156 U.S. 432, 456 (1895) ("'[T]he law holds that
it is better that ten guilty persons escape than that one innocent suffer."') (quoting 2
WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *358). The Court in Addington should have
shown greater concern with preventing wrongful commitment.
83. The implications of this are chilling in light of Rosenhan's conclusion that
"[tihe [nlormal [a]re [n]ot [djetectably [s]ane." Rosenhan, supra note 53, at 252.
84. The Jews at Masada are an example of a people preferring liberty to life itself.
See, e.g., YIGAEL YADIN, MASADA: HEROD'S FORTRESS AND THE ZEALOTS' LAST STAND
232-37 (1966); see also R. M. Hare, Liberty and Equality: How Politics Masquerades
as Philosophy, 2 SOC. PHIL. & POL'Y 1, 1-2 (1984) (discussing liberty as a universal
value and providing historical examples of individuals and cultures choosing a worse
condition of their own malng over a better condition imposed from without).
85. As a logical matter, those who are subjected to involuntary commitment hear-
ings do not prefer treatment to liberty. This preference is not evidence of a rational
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been held throughout time and across cultures.8 Because the
Court permits a burden of proof below "beyond a reasonable
doubt," evidentiary rules become particularly important.
7
The Evzdentzary Requirements
The question of whether the accused presents a danger to
himself or others typically turns on the expert testimony of psy-
chiatrists.8 Although variations exist among the States, the
foundation upon which the testifying psychiatrist bases his opin-
ion typically must meet a comparatively low threshold.89 Only
five States require evidence of recent overt conduct that caused
or threatened to cause harm before the state can involuntarily
commit an individual." Moreover, the testifying psychiatrist
need not be in an ongoing treatment relationship with the ac-
cused in order to render an opinion as to the accused's potential
deficiency. As no less a man of reason than Benjamin Franklin said: "They that can
give up essential liberty to obtain a little temporary safety deserve neither liberty nor
safety." FAMILIAR QUOTATIONS 310 (16th ed., J. Bartlett ed., 1992).
86. Hare, supra note 84, at 1-2.
87. Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 431 (1979).
88. Id. at 429.
89. See, e.g., In re Melton, 597 A.2d 892, 894-95 (D.C. 1991) (approving commit,
ment based on the testimony of psychiatrist relying almost exclusively on hearsay
information supplied by family members to support his prediction of dangerousness).
90. Memorandum from Kelley O'Brien to Thomas L. Hafemeister, Senior Research
Associate, Institute on Mental Disability and the Law, National Center for State
Courts (Mar. 1993) (on file with the author) (used with permission of Thomas L.
Hafemeister) [hereinafter O'Brien Memorandum]. The O'Brien Memorandum is a
working document prepared for the internal use of IMDL and is intended as a com-
plete State-by-State review of commitment statutes. See also Project Release v.
Prevost, 722 F.2d 960, 973-74 (2d Cir. 1983) (holding that commitment of an individ-
ual without evidence of overt conduct showing substantial risk of serious harm does
not violate substantive due process); In re Albright, 836 P.2d 1, 5-6 (Kan. Ct. App.
1992) (upholding constitutionality of Kansas statute permitting commitment in the
absence of a recent, overtly dangerous act); Hatcher v. Wachtel, 269 S.E.2d 849, 852
(W. Va. 1980) (holding that commitment did not require a showing of imminent or
substantial danger). But see Wyatt v. King, 781 F. Supp. 750, 753 (M.D. Ala. 1991)
(applying Alabama law and requiring evidence of a recent overt act to continue a
commitment predicated on dangerousness); Doremus v. Farrell, 407 F. Supp. 509,
514-15 (D. Neb. 1975) (requiring evidence of a recent overt "dangerous" act, and
other due process protection, before ordermg involuntary commitment); In re Harris,
654 P.2d 109, 113 (Wash. 1982) (en banc) (requiring evidence of a recent overt act
showing a substantial risk of harm).
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for future violence.91 A single examination, conducted immedi-
ately before and pursuant to the commitment hearing, provides a
sufficient basis for the expert prediction of dangerousness.92 The
pre-commitment hearing interview need not be a full-fledged
mental status exam.9s The Court even may accept expert predic-
tion of the accused's potential for future dangerousness when the
testifying psychiatrist has never examined nor spoken to the
accused, and the sole ground for forming the expert opinion is
hypothetical questions posed to her by the prosecutor "
91. See McLean v. Sale, 284 S.E.2d 160, 163 (N.C. Ct. App. 1981), cert. denied, 290
S.E.2d 703 (N.C. 1982).
92. In re Brown, 493 A.2d 447, 449-50 (N.H. 1986).
93. Id. at 450 (stating that the fact that the exam is short in duration is not, by
itself, grounds to regard the resulting examination as deficient). A mental status ex-
ammation is the standard method of assessing relative mental health and proper
diagnosis. A full fledged mental status examination can take three hours or more to
complete. By contrast, the average pre-commitment examination in the present case
study, see infra tbl. A, was less than twenty minutes, a figure consistent with that
reported elsewhere; see Thomas J. Scheff, Social Conditions for Rationality: How
Urban and Rural Courts Deal with the Mentally Ill, in MENTAL ILLNESS AND SOCIAL
PROCESSES 109, 112 (Thomas J. Scheff ed., 1967) (finding average psycluatric assess-
ment interview in one urban court lasted 9.2 minutes). For a full description of a
mental status exam, see EKKEHARD OTHMER & SIEGLINDE OTHMER, THE CLINICAL
INTERVIEW USING DSM-III-R 109-74 (1989).
94. Cf Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 903-05 (1983). Barefoot concerned expert
testimony offered in support of the death penalty. If the Supreme Court was willing
to allow diagnosis by hypothetical in the context of the ultimate punishment, the
Court likely would permit such a basis for expert psychiatric testimony in a civil
commitment hearing.
Because this Note includes a case study of commitment hearings in Virginia, see
infra notes 181-215 and accompanying text, it is noteworthy that Virgima also allows
expert opinion based on hypothetical questions posed to the expert during direct
examination subject to minimal restrictions, see CHARLES E. FRIEND, THE LAW OF
EVIDENCE IN VIRGINIA § 218 (3d ed. 1988). For a discussion of the Virginia Rules of
Evidence as they relate to expert testimony in an involuntary commitment hearing,
see infra notes 177-80 and accompanying text.
The tolerance for expert predictions based upon hypothetical questions is con-
sistent with the Federal Rules of Evidence. Rule 703 governs the permissible bases of
expert opinion testimony. See FED. R. EVID. 703. The rule is permissive, allowing
opinion to be formed in any manner an expert might reasonably form an opinion in
his practice. Id. The advisory committee note specifically includes hypothetical ques-
tions as a permissible basis of opinion at trial. Id. cmt.
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CrintCsms
Both Pro-Treatment and Pro-Rights critics have criticized the
guidelines, rules, and processes by which civil commitment hear-
ings are conducted, as well as the legal standards specifying the
permissible boundaries of commitment. Pro-Treatment activists
see the current process as hopelessly misguided in approach. Pro-
Rightists are concerned that the present rules are based on a
fundamental misunderstanding of the doctor-patient relationship
at play in a pre-commitment examination, which, in turn, creates
an unfair playing field.
The Pro-Treatment Critique
Pro-Treatment proponents believe that the law should be re-
structured, in virtually every field, to capitalize on its opportunity
to serve as a therapeutic force.95 This approach focuses on the
therapeutic or anti-therapeutic effect of existing legal rules, roles,
and procedures.9 Advocates of "therapeutic jurisprudence" seek
to revolutionize the law so that lawyers as well as judges would
act as therapeutic agents. 7 "The psychological perspective
highlights the importance of conducting judicial hearings in ways
that will have positive psychological consequences on those who
undergo commitment hearings.""8
Under a therapeutic jurisprudence approach, judges would
require those pleading guilty to take the stand and give a detailed
recital of their crime or other transgression.99 This recitation
would constitute a first step toward the cognitive restructuring
95. Wexler, supra note 71, at 280. The therapeutic jurisprudence approach arose
from mental health law. Wexler believes the approach would be of value in a wide
range of fields of law, including criminal law, health law, and family law. Id. at 281;
see also Tom R. Tyler, The Psychological Consequences of Judicial Procedures: Im-
plications for Civil Commitment Hearings, 46 SMU L. REV. 433 (1992) (discussing the
therapeutic effects of the commitment process); David B. Wexler & Bruce J. Wimck,
Therapeutic Jurisprudence and Criminal Justice Mental Health Issues, 16 MENTAL &
PHYSICAL DISABILITY L. REP 225 (1992) (explaining how therapeutic jurisprudence
can be applied to criminal justice and mental health issues).
96. Wexler & Wimck, supra note 95, at 225.
97. Wexler, supra note 71, at 285-89.
98. Tyler, supra note 95, at 444.
99. Wexler, supra note 71, at 286-87. The judge could ask.the defendant questions
about the crime or allow the defendant to make his own statement.
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process of psychotherapy "0 Defendants who admit every aspect
of their guilt would receive a more lenient sentence than those
who attempt to excuse their own behavior. Those who contest the
government's case could be subject to even harsher sentencing
upon a finding of guilt.'0 '
Professor Wexler's suggestion is fraught with problems. First,
despite the author's conclusory denial, 102 therapeutic jurspru-
dence represents the ultimate victory of the therapeutic state.
Every defendant, regardless of the strength of the case against
him, would be subject to this therapeutic approach. The threat of
harsher punishment upon a finding of guilt after trial would
significantly curtail the right to defend.'0 '
Wexler either overestimates the skills of judges or underesti-
mates the skills of therapists when he suggests that judges can,
in effect, perform therapy in the courtroom.' Psychotherapeu-
tic techniques are not parlor tricks to be used indiscriminately by
the mildly informed. Wexler actually recognizes the critique that
"'judges make lousy social workers."" 5 In response, he stresses
that because judges impact defendants in a manner similar to
social workers, the system should recognize and capitalize on this
100. Id. at 290 (asserting the potential for judges to employ cognitive restructuring
as a first step in the rehabilitative process).
101. Id. at 287. Harsher sentencing after trial would require that the judge find the
defense perjurious. Wexler offers no guidelines to restrain a judge from so finding.
102. "Therapeutic jurisprudence in no way advocates coercion, paternalism, or a
'therapeutic State."' Id. at 280.
103. Tis curtailment implicates possible constitutional violations under Blackledge v.
Perry, 417 U.S. 21 (1974) and North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711 (1969); see
infra notes 111-20 and accompanying text
104. "'[N]o great amount of specialized training' is required to use the recommend-
ed [therapy] techniques." Wexler, supra note 71, at 298 (quoting DONALD
MEICHENBAUM & DENNIS C. TURK, FACILITATING TREATMENT ADHERENCE: A
PRACTITIONER'S GUIDEBOOK 261 (1987)). Note that Meichenbaum and Turk's book
addresses skilled practitioners in the helping professions, not laypeople. "Helping
professionals" are considered to include physicians, psychologists and psychiatrists,
social workers, nurses, and, possibly, mental health paraprofessionals such as alco-
holism counselors. Frederick H. Kanfer & Arnold P Goldstein, Introduction, in HELP-
ING PEOPLE CHANGE 2 (Frederick H. Kanfer & Arnold P Goldstein eds., 1986). Judg-
es and lawyers are conspicuously absent from this list.
105. Wexler, supra note 71, at 298 (quoting Gary B. Melton, The Law is a Good
Thing (Psychology Is, Too): Human Rights in Psychological Jurisprudence, 16 LAW &
HUM. BEHAV. 381, 386 (1992).
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aspect of the judge's role.' Wexler fails to appreciate the thera-
peutic effect of being held accountable for the consequences of
one's own behavior without condescending attempts at pater-
nalism. 0
7
Further, under his plan, the reach of therapeutic jurisprudence
would extend past trial and intrude into the treatment of the
convicted defendant. The detailed admission of guilt required to
receive the most lenient sentence could be used against the de-
fendant after trial. Wexler specifically recommends that trial
transcripts be used to. confront the offender if he tries to deny
guilt after placement in a treatment program.' 8 In addition to
constituting a serious denial of privacy within the treatment
setting,' 9 this use of the admission of guilt would also jeopar-
dize the defendant's rights in future trials."0
Therapeutic jurisprudence is more than just a bad idea. It is
probably unconstitutional as well. If the severity of a defendant's
sentence is correlated with the defendant's willingness to forfeit
his right to defend and take the stand to make a detailed confes-
sion of guilt, as Wexler suggests,"' then the defendant faces a
Hobson's choice: should he exercise his constitutional right to
defend at the risk of a significantly enhanced sentence?" 2
106. Wexler, supra note 71, at 298-99; see also Tyler, supra note 95, at 439 ("If
people leave commitment hearings with favorable views about the legitimacy of legal
authorities, such views are likely to facilitate the subsequent therapeutic process.").
107. Stanton Peele, a critic of the ever-expanding definition of, and treatment for,
alcoholism, cites research finding that drunk drivers who suffer criminal penalties
fare better than their counterparts who receive therapy rather than punishment.
STANTON PEELE, DISEASING OF AMERICA: ADDICTION TREATMENT OUT OF CONTROL 57
(1989); see also Daniel W. Shuman, Therapeutic Jurisprudence and Tort Law: A Lim-
ited Subjective Standard of Care, 46 SMU L. REV. 409, 409 n.4 (1992) (citing re-
search indicating better outcomes for patients following voluntary rather than invol-
untary mental hospitalization).
108. Wexler, supra note 71, at 287-88.
109. Because the court transcripts are a matter of public record, they can be used
against the defendant/patient without special permission. Currently, privacy laws pro-
tect the patient's nstory.
110. For example, ns testimony could be impugned in any future trial in which he
participates. Moreover, he could be subjected to harsher penalties after future convic-
tions for similar offenses based on a possibly strategic admission of guilt at an ear-
lier trial.
111. Wexler, supra note 71, at 286-87.
112. Indeed, under a therapeutic jurisprudence procedure, -the defendant would re-
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This issue raises the specter of vindictive sentencing."' Un-
der the holdings of North Carolina v. Pearce". and Blackledge
v. Perry," 5 a defendant may not be subjected to greater penal-
ties for vigorous use of his constitutional rights. Although the
Supreme Court has limited Pearce and Blackledge,"6 and "the
Due Process Clause is not offended by all possibilities of in-
creased punishment , but only by those that pose a realistic
likelihood of 'vindictiveness,""'" the prohibition against vindic-
tive sentencing continues to apply whenever "the government, in
response to a defendant's exercise of legally-protected rights,
brings additional or more severe [punishment] based on the same
underlying offense."" 8 Because the fear of possible vindictive
action tends to chill seriously a defendant's exercise of his consti-
tutional rights, the Court will apply vindictive sentencing analy-
sis even in the absence of actual retaliatory motivation." 9 The
Supreme Court likely would find that a defendant subjected to
harsher sentencing because he had chosen to mount a defense
demonstrates a "realistic likelihood of 'vindictiveness."
120
ceive the most "credit" for total acquiescence to every element of the State's case.
See zd.
113. Vindictive sentencing occurs when sentencing is enhanced m response to the
defendant's exercise of his constitutional rights. See generally Michael P Doss, Com-
ment, Resentenczng Defendants and the Protection Agaznst Multiple Punzshment, 133
U. PA. L. REV. 1409 (1985).
114. 395 U.S. 711 (1969) (finding a Fourteenth Amendment due process violation
when a judge increases the sentence upon reconviction after retrial following a suc-
cessful appeal).
115. 417 U.S. 21 (1974) (holding that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment is violated if there is a reasonable likelihood of prosecutorial vindictive-
ness toward a defendant who successfully exercised his constitutional rights).
116. For example, there is no prosecutorial vindictiveness when the State increases
charges after unsuccessful plea negotiations. Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357
(1978). Lower courts decline to apply prohibitions against vindictive sentencing to
charges that accrue after the onset of trial. United States v. Guyon, No. CRIM.A.93-
10166-Z, 1993 WL 499754, at *1 (D. Mass. Nov. 19, 1993) (finding no vindictiveness
present when prosecutor added failure-to-appear charge to original indictment after
defendant failed to appear at scheduled trial for bank fraud).
117. Perry, 417 U.S. at 27.
118. Guyon, 1993 WL 499754, at *2.
119. Perry, 417 U.S. at 27-28.
120. Id. at 27.
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The Pro-Rights Critzque
Pro-Rights proponents disagree with the evidentiary standards
for civil commitment on philosophical, constitutional, and practi-
cal grounds. First, they argue that the Supreme Court places too
much reliance on expert psychiatric testimony because of a fun-
damental misunderstanding of the psychiatrist-patient relation-
ship at play in a pre-commitment hearing. 2' Second, Pro-Rights
critics charge that the statutorily mandated, independent expert
evaluation insufficiently protects the defendant's due process
rights. 2 Third, Pro-Rights advocates complain that current evi-
dentiary rules create an unfair playing field, disadvantaging the
accused. 2
Philosophically, Pro-Rights proponents object to the Supreme
Court's overreliance on expert psychiatric testimony because the
Court misunderstands the nature of the doctor-patient relation-
ship upon which that testimony is based.2 4 The Court under-
stands the psychiatrist-client relationship as a voluntary and
cooperative professional-client interaction focused on the client's
best interests.'25 The Court assumes a psychiatrist-patient mod-
el based on "voluntary, private individualized interaction
involving the highest level of intimacy and trust."'26
This description does not capture the psychiatrist-patient rela-
tionship in the context of civil commitment. Far from voluntarily
consulting the physician of his choice, the typical defendant is
poor and cannot choose who will examine him. 7 During the
121. See Stefan, supra note 66, at 644.
122. Speiser, supra note 76, at 141-43.
123. See, e.g., Enms & Litwack, supra note 70, at 734-51.
124. Stefan, supra note 66, at 659.
125. Perhaps the clearest statement of the modern Court's image of the doc-
tor/patient relationship is Justice Blackmun's description m his dissent m Rust v.
Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991). Blackmun describes it as: "A unique relationship of
trust. [P]atients place their complete confidence, and often their very lives, m
the hands of medical professionals. One seeks a physician's aid not only for medica-
tion or diagnosis, but also for guidance, professional judgement, and vital emotional
support." Id. at 218 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Obviously, this model does not apply
to a doctor/patient interaction in which the patient wants only to be left alone and
has chosen neither the specific doctor nor any doctor at all.
126. Stefan, supra note 66, at 649.
127. Id. at 644.
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pre-commitment examination, the examining psychiatrist as-
sesses the accused's appropriateness for involuntary commit-
ment-a deprivation of liberty-but the accused has no right to
remain silent.' In fact, the accused receives only minimal infor-
mation regarding the future use of the examination.'29 When a
128. In re Pima County Mental Health Case, 721 P.2d 142, 144 (Ari. Ct. App.
1986) (holding a Miranda style warning unnecessary because a physician's examina-
tion prior to civil commitment hearing poses no danger of compulsory self-in-
crimiation); accord State v. Matthews, 613 P.2d 88, 90-91 (Or. Ct. App. 1980), cert.
denied, 450 U.S. 1040 (1981). But see McNeil v. Director, Paxutent Inst., 407 U.S.
245, 257 (1972) (Douglas, J., concurring) ("[Tihere is the threat of self-incrimination
whenever there is 'a deprivation of liberty."').
Defendants in civil commitment hearings apparently have few due process
protections. The California Supreme Court recently held the exclusionary rule inap-
plicable in a civil conservatorship proceeding. Lake County Mental Health Dep't v.
Susan T., 8 Cal. 4th 1005, 1010, 1014 (1994) (refusing to bar evidence obtained by
"a government official" who entered the defendant's home without a warrant while
the defendant was in state custody and "in the absence of any demonstrable exigent
circumstances").
129. The information supplied by Eastern State Hospital in Williamsburg, Virgina,
to those temporarily detained and awaiting a civil commitment hearing is typical. Its
complete text reads as follows:
DETENTION ORDER
You were sent here for an evaluation to determine whether or not
you need psychiatric treatment. You will be seen by a psychologist
I and
On at there will be a civil hearing to make the decision on
your need for treatment. You will be seen by an attorney
prior to the hearing. The attorney is appointed to ensure that your rights
are protected. You have a right to have witnesses present and the social
worker will assist you in contacting them.
The hearing is informal. The judge will hear the doctor's evaluation
and then he/she will hear from any community representatives and any
witnesses present. Your attorney will be able to question the doctor and
witnesses. You will then be given an opportunity to respond with your
attorney's assistance.
The judge will make one of three decisions:
1) you may be released
-or-
2) you may be allowed to sign yourself into the hospital as a vol-
untary patient if the doctor and the judge feel you are competent
to do so
-or-
3) you may be ordered to stay at the hospital. You have the right
to appeal this decision. Just let your attorney know if you desire
to appeal.
If you have any questions, please ask the staff.
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representative of the State, who will later testify for the State at
the accused's commitment hearing, forces the accused to submit
to an examination, the Supreme Court's model of a doctor-pa-
tient relationship "involving the highest level of intimacy and
trust"' is not applicable. Given the true nature of the doctor-
patient relationship in the civil commitment context, the Court
errs by putting more faith in the psychiatric expert's testimony
than the client puts into the expert's examination.
Moreover, in the civil commitment setting, the psychiatrist-
patient connection is in fact a captive relationship in which the
psychiatrist has an inescapable conflict of interest.' This con-
flict has several sources. At its most basic level, psychiatrists are
typically male,3 2 white, and reasonably affluent. 3 Civil com-
mitment defendants typically are not.' Although the mere fact
of a cultural gap between doctor and patient, standing alone,
should not receive excessive emphasis, the patently personal
nature of the assessment heightens the importance of this gap in
psychiatric assessment. In psychiatric assessment, psychiatrists
explicitly are taught to use their own (culturally derived) under-
standing of normal behavior as a baseline against which to assess
the normality of the examinee.3 5
Eastern State Hospital Detention Order (1994) (on file with William and Mary Law
Revmew).
This document is of little use to a person awaiting a civil commitment hearing.
A better, more protective, and complete informational packet would inform the ac-
cused of the exact grounds on which he could be involuntarily committed.
130. Stefan, supra note 66, at 649.
131. Id. at 644, 655-67.
132. Id. at 643 n.12 (noting that men compose 76.2% of all psychiatrists).
133. Id. at 658.
134. Id. at 659.
135. Medical training stresses the personal nature of the assessment and the
doctor's personal view of normality. See, e.g., RONALD S. KRUG & ALVAH R. CASS,
OKLAHOMA NOTES: BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES (2d ed. 1989) (a widely used study guide
for medical students). This study guide suggests the following guideline for assessing
the proper psychotropic medication to be used:
b. Put yourself in the patient's shoes:
(1) If given the same circumstances, you would feel the same
way-don't use anything.
(2) If you conclude you would feel differently, but understand
how the patient feels-minor tranquilizers.
(3) If you conclude that you don't know what the hell is
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The nature of psychiatric diagnostic categories themselves
compounds this unavoidable cultural bias. Classifications of psy-
chopathology tend to reinforce the cultural norms of those mak-
ing the diagnoses.'36 Ultimately, the classifications themselves
are reached, not via scientific advancement,'37 but through con-
sensus or actual vote.'38 Thus, both the individualized assess-
ment and the established classifications of psychopathology defin-
ing abnormality are highly dependant on cultural norms.
Finally, the psychiatrist's goal of treating the defendant is in
direct conflict with the defendant's desire to be left alone. 39
The defendant inevitably loses when these goals conflict: psychia-
trists tend to suspect the competence and judgement of those
who disagree with their recommendations.14 ° In sum, the testify-
ing psychiatrist may be decidedly less neutral than the Supreme
Court imagines."'
going on-probably antipsychotics or antidepressants.
Id. at 183.
In addition to learning an established scoring system, psychiatrists are taught to
use their own projections to ascertain the appropriateness of an exammee's responses
to projective stimuli such as Rorschach Tests and Thematic Apperception Tests. Some
projective tests, such as Sentence Completion, rely exclusively on the psychiatrist's
personal assessment for scoring. Id. at 98.
136. Stefan, supra note 66, at 661-62 (stating that psychiatric diagnostic categories
are created by consensus; the race, gender and socioeconomic status of those making
the determination is relevant to their views on the dividing line between normality
and abnormality); see Perlin, supra note 63, at 397 (noting that even mental health
professionals are susceptible to sanist myths); see also THOMAS J. SCHEFF, BEING
MENTALLY ILL 159 (1984) ("The separation of members of society along the axis of
sanity and insanity is largely a product of social rather than medical or scientific
selection."); cf SEYMOUR SARASON, PSYCHOLOGY MISDIRECTED (1981) (arguing that
psychologists must first examine their own biases and assumptions about what con-
stitutes normal and abnormal behavior before taking aim at society). But see DSM-IV,
supra note 10, at xxiv (stressing the difficulty in applying Personality Disorder crite-
ria across cultural settings).
137. DSM-IV, supra note 10, at xix (noting that a review of the empirical literature
had limited utility for some issues).
138. See id. at xviii-xx (describing the process for revision of DSM-IV).
139. Stefan, supra note 66, at 656-57.
140. Id. at 657. For a more detailed discussion of therapist reaction to patient dis-
agreement, see WILLIAM H. PINCUS, THE PROBLEM OF GAUGUIN'S THERAPIST: LAN-
GUAGE, MADNESS AND THERAPY 51-53 (1994) (noting that patient disagreement typi-
cally results in the upgrading of the psychiatric diagnosis and/or an increase in the
length of hospitalization).
141. Stefan, supra note 66, at 655-67.
1796
1995] CIVIL COMMITMENT AND INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS 1797
Apart from these problems in the relationship between doctor
and patient, the decision at issue in a commitment hearing is
constitutional, not clinical.' "[Jiudicial hearings involve due
process rights, while professional evaluations do not." ' An
expert's assurance that a particular course of action is in the best
treatment interests of the accused implicates the issue of whether
that course of action is constitutionally permissible.'44 Historical-
ly, psychiatric experts have ordered unconscionable treatment
such as the use of cattle prods on mentally ill patients to reduce
aggressive behavior. 45 Because the question of the clinical effec-
tiveness of a particular course of action is independent of the
question of its constitutionality, the latter question is properly
reserved for the trier of fact.46
Ignoring the distinction between the clinical efficacy and con-
stitutional validity of a particular course of treatment, the Su-
preme Court justifies the rather lax foundation for expert predic-
tions of dangerousness 47 by noting that the accused has the
opportunity for cross-examination and for calling his own expert
witnesses to dispute the testimony of the State's experts. 48 Al-
though these opportunities may exist in theory, as a practical
matter, they are rarely utilized. One obstacle to implementing
these defenses is the lack of zeal on the part of the attorneys de-
fending in the civil commitment context.149
142. Id. at 715-16. Interestingly, Pro-Treatment advocates also recognize this distinc-
tion. "Many of the issues at the heart of mental health law are legal, not clinical."
Wexler & Wimck, supra note 95, at 226.
143. Tyler, supra note 95, at 434 n.7.
144. Stefan, supra note 66, at 715-16.
145. Arnold M. Ludwig et al., The Control of Violent Behavwr Through Faradic
Shock, 148 J. NERVOUS & MENTAL DISEASE 624, 635-36 (1969). Arguably, a question
exists as to whether such treatment, if inflicted on an involuntarily committed pa-
tient, would so "shock the conscience" as to violate constitutional rights. See Rochm
v. Califorma, 342 U.S. 165 (1952).
146. See, e.g., State v. Krol, 344 A-2d 289 (N.J. 1975).
The determination of dangerousness involves a delicate balancing of
Society's interest in protection from harmful conduct against the
mdividuals interest in personal liberty and autonomy. This decision, while
requiring the court to make use of the assistance which medical testimony
may provide, is ultimately a legal one, not a medical one.
Id. at 302.
147. See supra notes 67-70 and accompanying text.
148. Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 898 (1983).
149. See Perlin, supra note 63, at 404-05 (1992). Perlin cites studies finding that
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A second obstacle to an effective defense is the poverty of the
typical defendant in psychiatric commitment hearings, coupled
with the State's refusal to pay for an examination by a psychia-
trist of the accused's choosing. 5 ° Pro-Rights critics charge that
this refusal is an affront to defendant's due process rights. 5'
The denial of a right to an independent psychiatrist at the
State's expense in the civil commitment context prohibits an
indigent defendant from mounting an adequate defense.'52 Al-
though State statutes typically provide for an examination by a
presumably neutral psychiatrist,'53 this provision is not the
equivalent of providing legal representation. The public defender
may be paid by the State, but his role, if not his actual perfor-
mance, is to zealously defend his client.' By contrast, State-
appointed psychiatric experts typically identify with the Staie's
interests and are far from neutral.'55
Yet even absolute neutrality would be insufficient to guard the
indigent defendant's due process rights. A defense psychiatrist is
representation by counsel in commitment hearings is so ineffective that when public
defender organizations represent the accused, his outcome is likely to be more favor-
able than if he retains private counsel. Id. at 405 n.243. Perlin cites another study
finding that the accused was more likely to be released if he appeared pro se than if
he paid for private representation. Id. at 404-05. The case study discussed in this
Note, infra notes 181-215 and accompanying text, also found the attitude of defense
attorneys to be less than zealous, see znfra notes 204-09 and accompanying text.
150. See Goetz v. Crosson, 967 F.2d 29 (2d Cir. 1992) (upholding summary judg-
ment dismissal of suit by involuntarily committed indigent patients charging State
with failure to provide independent psychiatric assistance). See generally Speiser,
supra note 76, at 143. But see Dommguez v. New Mexico, 798 P.2d 219 (N.M. Ct.
App. 1990) (granting indigent defendant independent expert assistance to contest ex-
tended involuntary commitment order).
151. Speiser, supra note 76, at 143. The court in Goetz failed to reach this question
in granting summary judgment.
152. Id.
153. Virginia's commitment statute is representative. Section 37.1-67.3 of the Vir-
gima Code requires the judge to order a psychological examination prior to the hear-
ing. VA. CODE ANN. § 37.1-67.3 (Michie Supp. 1994). The statute also permits the
defendant to arrange for an independent psychological evaluation at private expense.
Id.
154. The meaning of "zealous" defense in the civil commitment context is an open
question. See supra note 149 and accompanying text; infra notes 204-09 and accom-
panymg text.
155. Stefan, supra note 66, at 655-67; see also supra notes 131-41 and accompany-
ing text.
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an absolute necessity in civil commitment hearings. "No matter
how brilliant the lawyer may be, he is in no position to effectively
contest the commitment proceedings because he has no way to
rebut the testimony of the psychiatrist from the institution who
has already certified to the patient's insanity "156 As the Su-
preme Court has noted, psychiatrists can assist defense counsel
in a variety of important ways: "psychiatrists gather facts [to]
share with the judge , they analyze the information gathered
and from it draw plausible conclusions about the defendant's
mental condition They know the probative questions to ask
of the opposing party's psychiatrists and how to interpret their
answers. 157
There are two weaknesses with the Pro-Rights emphasis on
the need for an independent psychiatrist to buttress the defense
in a civil commitment hearing. As a practical matter, even if the
accused was provided with an independent psychiatric examina-
tion, given the relative costs of error, a defense psychiatrist is
unlikely to testify that the accused is not dangerous.15 Thus,
the fact-finder would be left to decide between one expert who
says the defendant is dangerous and one who will say only that
dangerousness is unpredictable.'59 In addition, defense counsel
in civil commitment hearings typically assume a paternalistic
rather than a zealous approach to defending the rights of the
156. Speiser, supra note 76, at 190 (quoting In re Gannon, 301 A.2d 493, 496 (N.J.
Super. 1973)).
157. Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 80 (1985). Although Ake concerned the impor-
tance of a defense psycluatrist to a defense based on the insanity plea, the Court's
description of the possible contributions of a defense psychiatrist is readily transfer-
able to the civil commitment context. The plaintiffs in Goetz, citing Ake, asked for
expert assistance both for testimnomal purposes and for consultation with defense
counsel. Goetz v. Crosson, 967 F.2d 29, 33 (2d Cir. 1992).
158. Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 934 (1983) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (noting
that no responsible psycluatric expert would testify that the accused is not dangerous,
only that dangerousness is impossible to predict, leaving the jury to choose between
an expert who confidently predicts future violence and one who hedges his bet re-
garding the probable future behavior of the accused); see also PINCUS, supra note
140, at 87-88 (discussing the pressures that work against anyone in the spectrum of
authorities involved with a civil detamee--expert witnesses, judges, juries, and, after
detention has been ordered, the treating psychiatrist with the power to dis-
charge-who reach the conclusion that the individual is not dangerous).
159. See Barefoot, 463 U.S. at 934 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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accused. ° An independent psychiatrist's advice, therefore,
would fall on unenthusiastic ears. 1'
Hypothetical
Returning to the hypothetical case described earlier,'62 imag-
ine that Paul, our songwriting ex-stockbroker, and his family
have exhausted all their funds in pursuit of his "being discov-
ered" after he quit his job. During this time, he had arranged a
genuine opportunity for significant public exposure, but the pub-
lic flatly rejected his work. Paul still can return to his old job
with the brokerage house, and his wife begs him to do so. He re-
fuses, suspecting his wife of sabotaging his big chance. More
certain than ever of his own musical genius, he tells her he has
decided to leave her and the children in order to pursue his "art."
She has him temporarily committed to a mental hospital to await
a civil commitment hearing.
From a Pro-Treatment perspective, Paul's commitment is long
overdue. The evidence of his dramatic decline is clear and con-
vincing. A psychiatrist likely would find that his abrupt change of
careers and his decision to leave his family are signs of depres-
sion. His persistent belief in his own "genius," despite empirical
evidence to the contrary-the public rejection of his work-may
further suggest a Delusional Disorder, Grandiose Type. Failure to
commit the ex-stockbroker would, in effect, make society
complicitous in his self-destruction and the destruction of his family
Pro-Rights advocates might accept, arguendo, the psychiatric
diagnosis and still maintain that no compelling case has been
established explaining why the State must forcefully commit
Paul. He may be depressed and even delusional; clearly he has
made a series of poor choices. However, there is still no showing
that Paul is a danger to anyone nor that he is unable to meet his
basic needs. A Pro-Rightist might believe, from a personal per-
spective, that the ex-stockbroker is acting irrationally and against
his own interests and those of his family yet maintain that the
160. Perlin, supra note 63, at 404-05.
161. Possibly, counsel would defend more zealously if they had the reassurance of
an "expert" that the defendant did not require confinement.
162. See supra text accompanying notes 73-75.
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State has no right to interfere.
LIMITED CASE STUDY OF ACTUAL COMMITMENT HEARINGS:
WEIGHING THE THEORETICAL CRITIQUES AGAINST ACTUAL
PRACTICE
In order better to assess the relative merits of the contempo-
rary criticisms of the civil commitment process,"' this Note will
discuss a case study This study consisted of observing ten com-
mitment hearings in a Virginia State mental hospital for the
purpose of assessing both how the current laws governing com-
mitment are applied and the relative merits of the diametrically
opposed critiques discussed throughout this Note. Before discuss-
ing the results of this case study, it is necessary to address the
Virginia commitment statute and Virginia laws of evidence rela-
tive to other approaches nationwide.
Relevance
The Similarities and Differences Between Virginia and Other
States' Statutory Authorizations of Involuntary Commitment
Proceedings
States employ varying standards for involuntary commit-
ment.'64 These standards tend to fall into four categories: (1)
Physical Danger-requiring serious harm involving physical inju-
ry,165 (2) Imminent Danger-requiring the likelihood of a sub-
stantial risk of danger in the near future,166 (3) Overt Con-
duct-requiring that the finding of dangerousness to self or oth-
ers be supported by a "recent overt act,"' 67 and (4) Gravely Dis-
163. See supra notes 32-72, 95-161 and accompanying text.
164. Kaufman, supra note 16, at 346-58. Kaufman's review of state statutes is not
exhaustive and intended for illustrative purposes only. See also O'Brien Memorandum,
supra note 90.
165. Kaufman, supra note 16, at 346-47; O'Brien Memorandum, supra note 90. Both
Kaufman and the O'Brien Memorandum list seven states employing this standard.
166. Kaufman, supra note 16, at 347-51. Kaufman cites seven states with this crite-
ra. Id. at n.76. The O'Brien Memorandum, lists 33 states employing the "imminent
danger standard." O'Brien Memorandum, supra note 90.
167. Kaufman, supra note 16, at 351-52. Kaufman does not cite any state that has
adopted this criteria by statute but refers to a West Virgiua case, Hatcher v.
Wachtel, 269 S.E.2d 849 (W. Va. 1980), in which the court rejected commitment
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abled-allowing for commitment of persons whom the State re-
gards as unable to meet their most basic needs. Under the fourth
standard, the court must find that the self-neglect would eventu-
ally lead to such personal deterioration that the person would
become a danger to himself.1 8
Approximately one-third of the states restrict commitment to
those who are adjudged dangerous, using one of the three defi-
nitions discussed above, whereas the majority of states also per-
mit commitment of the gravely disabled.'69 The gravely disabled
standard is considered the more lenient commitment criteria'70
because it is more discretionary
In Virginia, the involuntary commitment of persons to psychi-
atric hospitals is governed by section 37.1-67.3 of the Code of
Virginia. This statute authorizes involuntary detention when the
judge finds either that the person is mentally ill and presents an
imminent danger to himself or others, or is so mentally impaired
as to be "substantially unable to care for himself."'' In addi-
tion, the judge must determine that no less restrictive treatment
setting would be satisfactory 17 Thus, Virginia's criteria for
commitment is identical, in whole or in part, to the criterion
most other states employ 173
The judge's findings typically are based upon the testimony of
expert witnesses, usually psychiatric experts who have examined
the accused. Virginia, like most other states, mandates that the
state provide such an examination prior to the commitment pro-
cess.' 4 Also consistent with the approach taken by other states,
based on the imminent danger standard but ordered commitment on the strength of
evidence of a recent patently dangerous action. See also Doremus v. Farrell, 407 F
Supp. 509 (D. Neb. 1975) (requiring overt act evidence).
The O'Brien Memorandum, supra note 90, attributes a recent overt act standard
to five states.
168. Kaufman, supra note 16, at 352-58. Kaufman cites eight States employing this
standard. Id. at 353 n.94. The O'Brien Memorandum, supra note 90, lists 17 States
using the "gravely disabled" term of art as their statutory standard and another 11
states employing analogous provisions which allow commitment if defendants are
incapable of understanding their need for treatment.
169. KANTER, supra note 38, at 23 n.35.
170. Id.
171. VA. CODE ANN. § 37.1-67.3 (Michie Supp. 1994).
172. Id.
173. KANTER, supra note 38, at 23 n.35.
174. VA. CODE ANN. § 37.1-67.3 ("[T]he judge shall require an examination ").
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Virginia allows the accused to rebut with testimony from a pri-
vate examiner but will not provide indigent defendants with
funds for this independent evaluation.175 In Virginia, the exam-
iner must determine whether probable cause exists to believe
that the person is mentally ill, that the person is imminently
dangerous to self or others, and that involuntary hospitalization
is required.176
The Similarities and Differences in the Rules of Evidence
Employed by Virginia and States Adopting the Federal Rules
Although Virginia has not adopted the Federal Rules of Evi-
dence, recent changes to the Virginia Code177 have brought its
rules regarding expert testimony into accord with the Federal
Rules.'78 Both Virginia and the Federal Rules allow experts to
base their opinions on inadmissible hearsay evidence if it is the
type of evidence upon which experts in the field normally re-
ly 79-- including hearsay evidence such as reports from family
members regarding the behavior of the accused. The expert need
not lay the foundation for his opinion, but opposing counsel may
inquire into the basis of the opinion on cross examination.8 In
Tis requirement is similar to that mandated by other states. See, e.g., Speiser, supra
note 76, at 151 & n.46.
175. The Virginia Code provides in relevant part that the defendant may "obtain
independent evaluation and expert opinion at his own expense." VA. CODE ANN. §
37.1-67.3; see also Speiser, supra note 76, at 151-56 (discussing New York's refusal to
provide an indigent defendant with a psychological expert for the defense).
176. VA. CODE ANN. § 37.1-67.3. Note that although the Virginia Code allows for
forced hospitalization of a person deemed substantially unable to care for himself, the
psyciatric evaluation ordered pursuant to the commitment hearing does not mandate
a fimding on this issue. Id. Although the examiner must determine if the person is
mentally ill, the requisite incapacity to care for self clearly exceeds the mere exis-
tence of mental illness. The statute, therefore, contradicts the Supreme Court's hold-
ing that the State may not confine an individual solely on the basis of a finding of
mental illness. See O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 575 (1975).
177. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-401.1 (Michie Supp. 1994) was amended in 1982 to
bring the rules governing opinion testimony by expert witnesses in accord with FED.
R. EVID. 703.
178. "Code § 8.01-401.1 was based, with minor alterations, upon Federal Rules of
Evidence 703 and 705." McMunn v. Tatum, 379 S.E.2d 908, 911 (Va. 1989); see also
FRIEND, supra note 94, § 217 (Supp. 1992).
179. FED. R. EVID. 703; VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-401.1.
180. FRIEND, supra note 94, at 206-09 (Supp. 1992).
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all important respects, the Virginia rules of evidence mirror the
federal rules regarding the admission of expert testimony in a
psychiatric commitment hearing. Thus, a case study of civil com-
mitment hearings in Virginia provides a fair platform for reflec-
tion on the merits of current commitment standards and rules.
The Case Study
Purpose
The purpose of this case study was to observe the application
of the law in actual practice and to assess the relative merits of
the Pro-Treatment and Pro-Rights critiques.18 ' The sample size
is too small to reach any statistically significant conclusions.
However, Table A summarizes the results.
Methodology
At each hearing, I focused on the following questions: (1) What
behavior brought the subject of the hearings to the attention of
the civil authorities? (2) By what methods did the examining
psychiatric expert 82 assess the mental condition and putative
dangerousness or incapacity of the subject and how much time
was spent in the assessment? (3) What did the examining psychi-
atric expert recommend? (4) What evidence supported the recom-
mendation? (5) What evidence was presented in rebuttal, and
what was the defense attorney's attitude toward defending a
court-assigned client' in a civil commitment hearing? (6) What
did the judge' order9
181. For a discussion and critique of the justifications, guidelines, and evidentiary
requirements for civil commitment, see supra notes 16-161 and accompanying text.
182. In Virginia, as m virtually every state, a state-licensed psychiatrist or clinical
psychologist must first examine the person whose possible commitment is to be
weighed, or, if unavailable, a state-licensed physician or psychologist qualified in the
diagnosis of mental illness must conduct the examination. VA. CODE ANN. § 37.1-67.3
(Michie Supp. 1994).
183. In every case, the attorney appeared pro bono as assigned by the court. In
every case, the attorney had no prior relationship with the defendant and did not
anticipate any future relationship.
184. In Virginia, a "special justice," often another lawyer, conducts civil commitment
hearings. For purposes of this Note, the word "judge" will be employed.
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Findings
Observation of actual commitment hearings suggests the fol-
lowing findings:
Society is adequately protected by present commitment law
When the defendant in a civil commitment hearing had physically
assaulted someone, as did Patients 5" and 6, or when the pa-
tient had made serious threats of injury, as did Patient 9, they
were properly committed pursuant to the State's police power to
protect the general welfare.'86
185. Patient 5 voluntarily entered the hospital after assaulting hIs wife. See supra
tbl. A. Although he was not ordered into the hospital, his voluntary entry was strate-
gic and responsive to both civil commitment law and criminal law concerns.
186. See supra notes 16-30 and accompanying text
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TABLE A. C,
PATIENT RACE TRIGGERINGEVENT ASSESSMENT OPINION
NUMBER SEX (TM)"
1 BF prior commitment order expired; hospital not done; psychologist's opinion based reconmit as grave
seeks recommitment on in-hospital observations disabled
2 WM presently-hospitalized, voluntary patient in-hospital observation commit as dement
requests release and deteriorating
3 WM drunk in public (non-student on college interview commit as dangeri
campus) had left hospital AMA"' 3 (15 mm.) to self and others
days earlier
4 BM left hospital AMA picked up by police refused to cooperate commit as gravely
wearing only his underwear disabled
5 BM beat wife interview n/a
(<20 nn.)
6 BM assaultive behavior in jail could not be done' commit as gravely
disabled
7 WF suicidal gesture'" during alcohol binge interview release
(<20 nun.)
8 BM prior commitment order expired; in-hospital observations recommit as grave
hospital seeks re-commitment disabled
9 BM discovered running in traffic, shouting interview commit as mental
homicidal and suicidal threats, in posses- (<20 nun.) and dangerous
sion of a box cutter
10 W'F overdosed on prescription drugs and interview commit as danger
alcohol (<20 mm.) self
187. Where indicated, Assessment Time is based on Examiner's estimate.
188. AMA stands for "Against Medical Advice."
189. Patient 6 was transferred from jail to hospital m four-point restraints. The
only notation on his transfer papers read: "Assaultive behavior m jail." He was agi-
tated upon arrival at the hospital and the hospital staff administered Haldol, an anti-
psychotic. No assessment was attempted until the following morning. However, m the
morning, the patient was only semi-conscious and unable to carry on conversation.
He was also found to be suffering from a potentially fatal staph infection.
190. Suicide threats and/or attempts are highly successful manipulative devices.
Some personality types, such as Borderline Personalities, are masters of the unsuc-
cessful suicide attempt. Indeed, "recurrent suicidal behavior, gestures, or threats" is a
diagnostic criteria of Borderline Personality Disorder. DSM-IV, supra note 10, at 651.
Thus, it is not uncommon for a Borderline patient to have a history of six or more
"attempted suicides." However, it is equally common for these attempts to be highly
superficial. DSM-IV describes typical Borderline Personality Type behavior, in this
regard, as "frantic efforts to avoid abandonment such as self-mutilating." Id. at
650.
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STUDY OBSERVATIONS
191. Each Attorney was asked about his or her approach to defense m civil commit-
ment cases. "Social Welfare" indicates that the attorney was generally willing to
follow whatever the hospital recommended. "Zealous Defense" indicates that the attor-
ney intended to fulfill his or her normal institutional role. For a discussion of these
two models of attorney participation in civil commitment proceedings, see DONALD
H.J. HERMANN, REPRESENTING THE RESPONDENT IN CIVIL COMMITMENT PROCEEDINGS
2-10 (1985).
192. Although the defense attorney acquiesced in hospital recommendation, the pre-
siding judge refused to commit in the absence of any supporting evidence.
193. The State cannot commit a patient who agrees to enter voluntarily. A volun-
tary patient may sign out of the hospital at any time although the State may seek
commitment if the patient expresses an intention to leave.
EVIDENCE REBUTTAL OUTCOME
(DEFENSE ATIITtDE)iii
no specific evidence offered beyond psychologist's none release"
enclusary opinion (social welfare)
wandered away from group dunng outside activities twice none recommit
In past month; ocoasionally soiled pants (social welfare)
binge dnnker mood swings; refuses to comply with outpa- none commit
tient treatment (social welfare)
dnnks toilet water walks around in underwear, possible none commit
dementia; 11 previous commitments (social welfare)
n/a n/a admit
(social welfare) voluntarily'"
patient semi-conscious, had potentially fatal n/a commit
medical condition (zealous defense)
steady job and home, on-going outpatient treatment n/a release
(social welfare)
testimony as to patient's behavior and mental state at none recommit
time of original commitment (4 years earlier) (social welfare)
history of chronic mental illness; recent death of mother, cross exam re: present threat to self or others; commit
reports auditory hallucinations expert admits patient now denos homicidal or
suicidal ideation
(zealous defense)
history of substance abuse; history of hospitalizations; de- cross exam re: opinion of outpatient therapist commit
nies suicidal ideation but expert thinks she's lying that patient does not need commitment
(zealous defense)
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Pro-Rightists will note that these defendants committed recent
overt acts 9 ' demonstrating their dangerousness. A statute re-
quiring that commitment pursuant to a finding of dangerousness
be based on a recent overt act would have resulted in their com-
mitment. Such a statute, however, would have properly permitted
Patient 3,"5 whose dangerousness had to be inferred from his
drinking and non-compliant behavior, to go free. Patient 3 pro-
vides a clear example of the danger to personal freedom posed by
a commitment standard requiring less than a recent overt act.
Pro-Treatment advocates counter that a recent overt act stan-
dard would include only the most dangerous among the mentally
ill in need of confinement, frustrating social efforts to intervene
and help those mentally unstable individuals who, although they
have yet to commit an overtly dangerous act, are close to the
breaking point. Pro-Treatment advocates might point to Patient
419 as an example of such a person. Moreover, Pro-Treatment
advocates will note, the recent overt act standard necessarily
means that society can respond only after a menacing act by a
mentally ill individual. Obviously, some of these acts will result
in serious injury and even death to innocent victims.
The commitment statute is loosely construed. Even this limited
case study reveals multiple instances in which commitment was
ordered on the basis of a highly attenuated connection between
the defendant's behavior and either dangerousness or grave in-
ability to meet one's own needs. For example, a young man97
was committed after being found drunk on the campus of a col-
lege he did not attend. One might safely assume that he was not
the only person drinking on campus. But this behavior, coupled
with the fact that he had three days earlier exercised his option
as a voluntary patient to leave the hospital against medical ad-
vice 198 and with his adamant refusal to cooperate with any
outpatient treatment order, was sufficient to have him involun-
tarily committed.
194. See supra note 167 and accompanying text.
195. See supra tbl. A.
196. See supra tbl. A.
197. Patient 3, see supra tbl. A.
198. The patient said he had entered the hospital to escape pressure at home and
left when it seemed safe to return home.
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A second example of loose statutory construction is provided by
Patient 2.199 The hospital sought involuntary commitment when
this voluntary patient asked to leave. The testifying psychologist
opined that Patient 2 was demented and deteriorating and should
be committed as gravely disabled because he was unable to at-
tend to his basic needs. However, the only evidence offered in
support of this opinion was testimony that, in the preceding
month, the patient had twice wandered off during group activi-
ties and that the patient was occasionally incontinent. Although
the testifying psychologist interpreted Patient 2's wandering
away from group activities as a sign of dementia, this behavior is
also perfectly consistent with the goal-directed behavior of a per-
son who no longer wishes to be part of any hospital group. Never-
theless, the judge ordered involuntary commitment.
These examples support the Pro-Rights critique that the lack
of clearly defined standards-a requirement of a recent, overtly
dangerous act, or a patent inability to care for self-allows judges
to apply an overly loose construction of commitment statutes.2 °
Judges apply such loose standards, Pro-Rightists contend, be-
cause they are themselves susceptible to "sanist myths" of the
dangerousness and extreme disability of the mentally ill. 01
However, Pro-Treatment advocates argue that loose construc-
tion is necessary because the dangerousness or grave incapacity
standard is too high a burden to meet. 2 Patient 2, they would
probably concede, is neither dangerous nor wholly lacking in
ability to care for himself. Yet in his dementia, he can be cared
for best in a hospital setting. To release this person would be
akin to failing our social obligation to protect him.
Pro-Treatment proponents would likely make the same argu-
ment with regard to Patient 4.203 This man was found wander-
ing around in his underwear and was observed drinking water
from a toilet bowl. Although he may have some minimal capacity
199. See supra tbl. A.
200. See supra notes 63-68 and accompanying text.
201. See supra notes 64-65.
202. For the Pro-Treatment critique that dangerousness is an inappropriate standard
to determine the need for psychiatric hospitalization, see supra notes 32-44 and ac-
companying text.
203. See supra tbl. A.
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to attend to his own basic needs, his behavior clearly indicates
that both he and the community would be better off if he re-
ceived in-patient psychiatric care.
Lawyers are failing their professional role. Six different attor-
neys represented these ten defendants. Only two, when asked
prior to the hearings about their attitudes toward their profes-
sional obligations in the civil commitment context, expressed an
intention to zealously defend." 4 One of these two attorneys
added that although prepared to represent her client's expressed
interest, she personally believed that the client's expressed in-
terest was not consistent with his best interests.
Each of the other four attorneys stated that they were pre-
pared to follow whatever the psychologist recommended, al-
though emphasizing that they would not allow their clients to be
committed without any showing of need. °5 These attorneys saw
their compliance as serving the best interests of the community
and the client.
Although Pro-Treatment advocates might argue that these
attorneys' attitudes represent the common-sense view of the
community, the findings lend strong support to the Pro-Rights
critique that attorneys are failing their professional roles in the
context of commitment hearings.0 8 In this limited case study,
four of six attorneys abandoned their professional, adversarial
roles at the door of the commitment hearing.2 7 These attorneys
deferred to expert psychological judgment in the context of a
commitment hearing in a manner they certainly would not imi-
tate in any other context. This abdication of the professional role
204. One of these two attorneys represented Patient 6 who was so incapacitated as
to be unable to commumcate. The attorney, therefore, was unable to mount any
defense. The finding that defense counsel in civil commitment hearings take a pas-
sive, non-adversarial role is consistent with the results of other studies. See
HERMANN, supra note 187, at 25 (literature review reveals that the "passive best
interest approach" is most prevalent).
205. Note, however, that at least one attorney (representing Patient 1) accepted a
psychologist's conclusory opinion that his client was gravely disabled without any evi-
dentiary support. This patient was released only because the judge conducted his own
cross-examination to clarify that the psychologist was offering no evidence other than
her own unsupported opinion.
206. For the Pro-Rights critique of legal representation in civil commitment hear-
ings, see supra note 149.
207. See supra tbl. A, column 7.
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appears attributable to attorneys' unfamiliarity-and perhaps
discomfort-with the mentally ill2. and their lack of an infor-
mational base upon which to challenge professional opinion. 9
A "recent overt act or patent inability to care for self' commit-
ment standard, coupled with zealous representation, would pro-
vide the best balance between social welfare and individual rights.
More stringent criteria for commitment would constrain judicial
interpretation and defuse the problem of overly loose construc-
tion of commitment statutes. Moreover, a "recent overt act or
patent inability to care for self" standard would force the State to
present additional evidence to corroborate the expert psychologi-
cal opinion. Statutes should require corroboration of expert opin-
ion because the empirical research strongly supports the conclu-
sion that expert opinion, standing alone, never properly can be
considered clear and convincing. 10 However, no evidentiary re-
quirement or statutory criteria can provide sufficient protection
for the defendant in a civil commitment hearing without zealous
representation on the part of legal counsel.2
The present case study demonstrates multiple instances in
which clearer commitment criteria coupled with more zealous
legal representation would have led to a fairer result. Patients 2
and 8212 were both committed under a finding of grave disabil-
ity At Patient 8's hearing, no concrete disability was alleged. The
testifying psychologist merely discussed the patient's behavior
and mental condition upon admission four years earlier213 and
added that the patient had not improved. The attorney did not
attempt rebuttal. Even assuming that the hospital had sufficient
208. This unfamiliarity is an example of the "samst" influence on attorneys. See
Perlin, supra note 63, at 404-06.
209. For the inportance of a defense psychiatrist in helping counsel prepare to
defend a civil commitmnent hearing, see Speiser, supra note 76, at 148-49.
210. For the empirical critique of expert prediction of dangerousness, see supra
notes 67-70 and accompanying text.
211. For criticism of the ineffective role currently played by legal counsel, see supra
note 149.
212. See supra tbl. A.
213. Patient 8 had been continuously hospitalized for four years prior to the ob-
served commitment hearing. A commitment order is effective for up to 180 days. VA.
CODE ANN. § 37.1-67.3 (Michie Supp. 1994). The court may extend the commitment
after a recommitment hearing. Id.
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grounds for continuing this patient's commitment, such grounds
never surfaced. A patient who sought rehabilitation to prepare
for release would have no guidance as to the standard of normal-
cy he must meet in order to gain his liberty Moreover, the waiv-
er of cross examination theoretically allows the commitment to
continue, unchallenged, ad znfinztum.
The psychologist testifying at Patient 2's hearing did point to
specific behavior-wandering and incontinence-suggestive of
dementia and an inability to care for self. As noted, however, the
wandering behavior admits of competing interpretations,214 and
incontinence alone cannot constitute grounds for commitment.
However, no rebuttal was offered and, with only one interpreta-
tion of the facts before him, the judge ordered commitment.
In contrast to these cases, Patient 9215 provides an example of
how stricter commitment criteria and zealous defense result in
social protection and due consideration of individual rights. Al-
though this patient had not actually attacked anyone, he had
threatened to kill randomly while clearly emotionally distressed
and in possession of a weapon. This episode would satisfy a "re-
cent overt act" standard were one in place. Defense counsel, in
this instance, conducted a vigorous cross examination under
which the testifying psychologist admitted that the defendant
presently denied any suicidal or homicidal ideation. With a full
airing of the evidence, the judge, as fact-finder, exercised his
prerogative to believe the expert's testimony that the defendant
was lying about his present intentions over the defendant's testi-
mony that his dangerous impulse had passed. The judge ordered
commitment. He may well have declined to do so absent a recent
overt act. This case illustrates that more stringent commitment
criteria and active legal representation could better balance the
competing interests at stake in a civil commitment hearing.
Hypothetical
Returning to our hypothetical case presented earlier,21 the
lessons learned from our case study strongly suggest that Paul
214. See supra text accompanying and following note 199.
215. See supra tbl. A.
216. See supra text accompanying notes 73-75, 162-63.
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would be committed involuntarily
Recalling the pertinent facts, Paul, a successful stockbroker,
abruptly quits his job to pursue a career as a songwriter. He has
had only minimal prior musical experience, yet believes himself a
musical genius. He persists in this belief even after public rejec-
tion of his work and blames his wife for sabotaging his opportu-
nity When his wife begs him to return to his former job, Paul
announces his decision to leave her and the children in order to
pursue his musical career. She seeks to have him committed.
Although he has done nothing to indicate that he is dangerous
or incapable of caring for himself, a psychiatrist is likely to rec-
ommend involuntary commitment. Paul's downward spiral, fi-
nancially and vocationally, likely would be interpreted as signs of
depression. His abrupt decision to leave his family and his delu-
sional belief in his talent suggest a declining capacity to care for
himself and an imminent future dangerousness to either himself
or his family
Although the psychologist's opinion could be challenged by
vigorous cross examination, demonstrating that Paul's desire to
leave his wife or the decision to change careers is not inherently
irrational or dangerous, the present case study suggests that the
psychologist likely would not be cross examined at all.217 Fur-
ther, given the loose statutory interpretations typically applied by
judges in commitment hearings, the psychologist's opinion sup-
ported by the behavioral evidence contained in this hypothetical
would certainly be sufficient for the judge to order Paul's com-
mitment.
CONCLUSION
The Wrong Balance Has Been Struck
The present review of commitment standards and competing
criticisms highlights the essential principles at stake: individual
liberty versus social welfare. Consistency with our constitutional
philosophy of elevating individual rights over state concerns de-
mands that we either err on the side of allowing too much liberty
or demonstrate a substantial reason for curtailing the rights of
217. See supra notes 204-09 and accompanying text.
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the mentally ill. The burden must be on those seeking to curtail
individual rights to demonstrate the necessity of so doing.
Those who support even broader civil commitment authority
ground their argument in two main points. First, Pro-Treatment
advocates assert that broad civil commitment power is necessary
to protect the wider society from the dangers posed by the men-
tally ill.21 Second, they maintain that civil commitment is not
punishment; rather it is a humane approach to caring for those
who cannot care for themselves.219
These arguments are not sufficient to carry the burden of
demonstrating a substantial need for curtailing the individual
rights of the mentally ill. First, psychological experts vastly
overpredict the dangerousness of the mentally ill. Empirical re-
search suggests that experts may overpredict dangerousness in as
many as eight of ten cases, and the most favorable estimates
credit expert prediction with no more than fifty percent accura-
cy 220 Such speculation should never be equated with "clear and
convincing" evidence.
As to the argument that commitment is necessary to protect
the mentally ill, the State may offer treatment to those who seek
it, but the idea of the State humanely mandating treatment for
those who resist is belied by the historical evidence. The State
has committed a woman for exercising independent religious
thought221 and a man for practicing vegetarianism. It was
not until 1972 that homosexuality ceased to be classified as men-
tal illness and, hence, potential grounds for commitment. 23
These examples are more than artifacts of the past; they are
cautionary statements about the future. On what primitive
grounds do we justify commitment today?
218. See ISAAC & ARMAT, supra note 25, at 340 (describing the needs of families to
protect themselves).
219. See supra notes 32-44 and accompanying text.
220. See supra note 70.
221. See supra notes 2-5 and accompanying text.
222. See supra notes 7-15 and accompanying text.
223. AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF
MENTAL DISORDERS 380 (3d ed. 1980) (describing the declassification of homosexuality
as a mental illness).
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The Past zs Prologue
In his history of Western Society's treatment of irrationality,
Madness and Civilizatzon,224  Foucault explores the forc-
es-political, social, economic, and religious-that led to the
"Great Confinement" of the insane, the unemployed, the idle,
and the disabled in the seventeenth century 225 Confinement
was, for classical man, a solution to the problem of the unpro-
ductive citizen:
[P]urely negative measures of exclusion were replaced by a
measure of confinement; the [unproductive] person was no
longer driven away or pumshed; he was taken in charge, at
the expense of the nation but at the cost of his individual
liberty Between him and society, an implicit system of obli-
gation was established: he had the right to be fed, but he must
accept the physical and moral constraint of confine-
ment.2
6
In the classical era, the State rationalized widespread confine-
ment of the socially-undesirable as moral rehabilitati6n.27 To-
day we call it medical treatment. In the classical era, as now,
confinement of the insane (and others) was seen as both neces-
sary and benign. Yet regardless of the rhetoric by which we justi-
fy confinement, the trade-off is the same: food and shelter at the
cost of personal freedom.
Such is the individual cost of social intolerance for irrationali-
ty Is there a social cost as well?
224. FOUCAULT, supra note 6.
225. Id. at 38-64.
226. Id. at 48.
227. Id. at 59 (noting that institutions of confinement had an "ethical status" and
were "moral institutions]"). Forced labor, as an institutional requirement was "an
exercise in moral reform which reveal[ed], if not the ultimate meaning, at least
the essential justification of confinement." Id. at 60.
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Hypothetical Unveiled
The hypothetical discussed throughout this Note. is loosely
based on the life of Paul Gauguin, the great post-impressionist
painter 229 Gauguin was himself a wealthy and successful stock-
broker23 ° who took up not songwriting but painting in his mid-
twenties.3 ' As with our hypothetical stockbroker, Gauguin be-
came so obsessed with painting and with a belief in his own ge-
nius, despite the lack of popular acceptance, that he abruptly quit
his job to devote himself exclusively to his art."2 After more
than a year of failure,23 Gauguin was able to arrange a major
public exhibition of his work.3 ' The exhibition not only failed
miserably,3 5 but his work was denounced as mad and immor-
al.236 Blaming his wife's family for his failure, he permanently
left her 237 Gauguin lived the remainder of his life unknown and
impoverished,2 8 but his work, and his genius, was discovered
228. See supra text accompanying notes 73-75, 162-63, 216-17.
229. For a discussion of Gauguin's life in the context of modern notions of psycho-
pathology, see PINCUS, supra note 140, at 109-18. For a more general biography, see
LAWRENCE HANSON & ELISABETH HANSON, NOBLE SAVAGE: THE LIFE OF PAUL
GAUGUIN (1955). For a thorough account of Gauguin's life in the South Pacific, see
BENGT DANIELSSON, GAUGUIN IN THE SOUTH SEAS (1966). The most complete discus-
sions of Gauguin's art are available in GAUGUIN: A RETROSPECTIVE (Marla Prather &
Charles F Stuckey eds., 1989), and m VOJTECH JIRAT-WASIUTYNSKI, PAUL GAUGUIN
IN THE CONTEXT OF SYMBOLISM (1978). For a fictionalized account of Gauguin's life,
see W. SOMERSET MAUGHAM, THE MOON AND SIXPENCE (1941).
230. Jean de Rotonchamp, On Gauguin as a Young Man, zn GAUGUIN: A RETRO-
SPECTIVE, supra note 229, at 37 (Gauguin "made a veritable fortune" in the stock
market).
231. Most researchers estimate that Gauguin began painting at age 25. ALFRED
WERNER, PAUL GAUGUIN 6 (1967). But see GAUGUIN: A RETROSPECTIVE, supra note
229, at 11 (estimating that he may have begun sketching as early as 23).
232. See HANSON & HANSON, supra note 229, at 48 (noting that Gauguin's decision
to quit work came as a complete shock to his wife).
233. Id. at 49-58 (describing Gauguin's life in the year after quitting his job and
moving to Rouen).
234. Gauguin's Copenhagen exhibition, the first solo display of is art, closed just
three days after opemng. GAUGUIN: A RETROSPECTIVE, supra note 229, at 12.
235. Gauguin was so distraught by the failure of his show that he considered sui-
cide. See zd. at 52-53 (quoting letter from Gauguin to Camille Pissarro, May, 1885).
236. WERNER, supra note 231, at 6. The utter scorn that accompamed the rejection
of Gauguin's work is a powerful indicator of how grossly incongruent was his vision
of art with the prevailing aesthetics of hIs time.
237. HANSON & HANSON, supra note 229, at 61-64.
238. Within two years of abandoning his family, Gauguin was reduced to poverty.
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after his death."9
What if Gauguin's wife had sought involuntary hospitalization
for her husband under modern commitment laws? As the analysis
of the hypothetical suggests, Gauguin likely would have been
hospitalized. His life certainly would have been differ-
ent-perhaps easier-but at the cost of realizing his genius. Soci-
ety itself would be poorer.
William Hoffman Pincus
Id. at 69. The legacy of is final years is one of suffering. Id. at 248-81; see also
DANIEISSON, supra note 229 (recounting Gauguin's later years).
239. HANSON & HANSON, supra note 229, at 282-83. After Gauguin's death, both hIs
commercial and artistic stock rose. Id. at 282. His paintings began to sell at ever
inflating prices, and the most renowned artists of his day began to acknowledge hIs
influence. Id. Gauguin is now considered, along with Vincent Van Gogh, to be one of
the fathers of Post-Impressionism. Id. at 282-83.
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